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Motto: “The EU is a project, which will always be in the making, constantly being revised 
and open to different social forces and interests. [...] The EU represents an on-going 
political, social and cultural process. Within frames as a widening Globalization, Multi 
Level Governance and emergence of displayed identities, the project will keep adjusting 
itself, as it is liable to new social structure phenomena.”2 
Fredrik Söderbaum 
”In some sub-national regions, [...] there are powerful autonomist or separatist movements 
which mostly see the EU as a way to by-pass the nation-state. They think that accelerating 
direct relations with the EU will probably positively affect their autonomy.”3 
Selcen Öner 
Abstract:  
The ability to successfully manage finances is considered to be proof of self-sufficiency 
and maturity. It is valid in the case of individuals as in the case of countries and regions. In 
an un-premeditated feedback loop, the EU funds are designed to create stronger regional 
autonomy which in turn fosters stronger demands of more funds particularly customized on 
regional identity and aimed at creating more regional power. Furthermore, when separate 
ethnic identity comes into picture emphasizing different interests from a perspective 
outside the majority, direct decision-making and enhanced space for manoeuvre becomes 
surprisingly appealing. It is not yet the time for a Europe of Regions; still, powers are 
being shifted within the national level. The present thesis hopes to define new concepts 
into the scholar research in understanding the EU-enhanced behaviour of autonomist 
regions. 
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Research Question: How does the European Union, by providing institutional structures 
and mainly financial resources, influence its autonomist Regions?  
Chapter I – Introduction:  
One of the main specificities of Europe in general and of the European Union as a focus 
point can be described by cliché mottos such as mosaic or unity in diversity, which in fact 
mean a blend of not only nationalities but also ethnicities. Out of those, some European 
ethnic groups with a long separate-identity tradition can be described as autonomist; that 
means that they aim at independent decision-making, self-governance, autonomy
4
 and/or 
eventually independence.
5
 Under a centralized EU structure, national borders give way to 
regional borders and sub-national authorities are gradually receiving incentives to handle 
EU affairs from a closer approach instead of leaving most decisions for the state capital.
6
  
From the bottom-up perspective, the EU represents a financial and institutional 
resource from the point of view of fund absorption. It unintentionally influences 
regional domestic perspective, regional responses and struggles for power shifting 
(between the three MLG levels). The topic of this thesis emphasizes what processes were 
generated in autonomist regions under EU financing bureaucracy. The focus will be set on 
two particular autonomist regions: Scotland in the United Kingdom and Székely Land or 
Szeklerland in Romania. Scotland used to be an independent territory
7
 while Szeklerland 
was part of the Habsburg
8
 and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire
9
. For the purpose of this 
work, I will use “autonomist” as the generic term referring to both case-study 
disintegrative regions, although in the case of Scotland, a historic nation with its own 
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political agenda
10
 and currently preparing an independence referendum, one could also say 
“potential separatist”. Also, I need to specify that “Szeklerland” is a self-named 
administrative unit unrecognized by the Romanian state and, it will be referred to in this 
paper as such only for easy-reading purposes instead of “the so-called Szeklerland”. Lastly, 
the term autonomist will only refer in the present thesis to disintegrative autonomists: 
areas populated by a national ethnical minority ”seeking greater autonomy or even 
separation”11 and will not refer to geographically distinct territories such as EU territories 
outside Europe.  
The hypothesis of the thesis is that organized groups representing both of these regions 
consider that their interest cannot be pursued by the central national government as 
efficiently as they would through the regional responsibility and simplified bureaucracy the 
EU can offer. As these regions are looking for independence, respectively autonomy, the 
European Union represents the most relevant superstructure they look up to in terms of 
commerce, financial help and dependence. In that sense, absorption of EU funds is one of 
most important criteria these autonomist regions are considering while pursuing their own 
interest, together with matters of internal finance, culture, development, education and 
language.
12
 The Scottish National Party, dominant in the current government, have 
strongly argued for direct and intrinsic EU membership for an independent Scotland, since 
threatened membership may dissolve internal regional support.
13
 Enjoying less importance 
within its state, the representatives of Szeklerland argue that the regional division used by 
the Romanian government for allocation of European structural funds
14
 is a deliberate 
strategy to fit the land in a broader, unnaturally framed administrative unit where the 
Hungarian majority will become a minority and therefore will not be able to represent and 
pursue its interests neither at a local level nor with regard to fund absorption and, on a 
general level, to representation within the EU.
15
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The incentive I had in choosing regions in the United Kingdom and Romania would be my 
desire to research this topic on countries within the EU that are highly contrasting as 
proven by the dichotomies pointed out by the divisions: continental versus insular, pro EU 
versus euro-sceptic, older versus newer member state, convergence versus competitiveness 
and employment region,
16
 a higher degree of self-governance for Scotland than for the 
Szeklerland and different individual history. The reason for them being different was a 
potential extrapolation of the thesis conclusion towards autonomist ethnical regions in the 
EU. Still, the basis for the comparison is their common positive attitude towards EU 
structural funds in their plans for an improved status quo within the nation state. Moreover, 
in the present light of Scotland aiming to hold a referendum on independence and 
Szeklerland requesting autonomy as an EU Region, a comparative case-study dealing with 
the importance of the EU structural funds as a bureaucratic institution in support of 
disintegrative purposes represents an intriguing and fairly fresh topic of academic research.   
As theoretical approach, in my view Multi-level Governance best explains the functioning 
of the EU. One of the envisioned aims of the paper is to use new empirical research to test 
and enlarge MLG applicability on autonomist regions in order to cultivate a more 
sophisticated view that would refine the theory and pave the way for extrapolations. 
Extended empirical research towards autonomist regions can only advance our 
understanding of MLG while my personal motivation lies both in the current character of 
the events presented in the case-study and in the desire to broaden the EU scholarly 
knowledge towards a new and less researched member state such as Romania. In that 
sense, UK and Scotland make a perfect comparison point as a widely known case of 
separate regional identity area and a milestone in EU studies and MLG literature.
17
  
A key aim of this chapter is the clarification of some important background concepts: EU 
Regionalisation as a political process leads to the introduction of regional policies which 
are the basis for the operation of the EU structural funds. One of the main aims of 
structural policy of the EU is to decrease uneven development throughout the Union and 
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low level of regional integration.
18
 The structural funds represent the main financial 
instrument of EU regional policy, the ERDF.
19
 EU regional funds are directed towards 
networks (interest groups, NGOs, regional agencies, associations etc) which reinforce 
regional representation.
20
   
While Scotland is already formed and established as four NUTS2 (basic regional division 
for the application of regional policies
21
), Romania has temporarily divided its territory 
during the 2007-2013 period in eight NUTS2 Regional Development Councils but with no 
legal personality and no real administrative powers.
22
 Consequently, according to the 
present legislative draft for a new administrative structure, the regions are to be represented 
by agencies with legal personality which will be of enormous benefit as a result of shared 
“competencies in between the state and the region [...] directed towards matters of 
international relations-especially with the EU”23 (Appendix 1). The current EU funds-
driven decentralisation reform undergoing in Romania has established the Centre Region 
(of NUTS2  level) as formed of three counties with clear Romanian majority and three 
counties (the North-East of the Centre Region) which the Hungarian minority intend to 
make official as Szeklerland, the most compact area in Romania inhabited mostly by 
Hungarians
24
 (Appendix 2).  
Regarding limitations I expect fewer resources about Romania than about the UK because 
of the different period of integration in the EU and of language barriers. Another 
envisioned limitation is not extending the applicability of the study towards radically 
eurosceptic regions.  
To conclude, the proposed topic qualifies as current, relevant and exceptionally interesting. 
With Scotland’s coming referendum and Szeklerland being revolted by the regional 
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territorial division implemented by the Romanian government, important questions are 
rising. Is the EU perceived as a favourable financial and institutional condition for an 
eventual deeper-than-the-current independence from the state? Is it that the EU funding 
policies can be seen as a potential safety net, aid or valuable collaborator for these regions 
in the process of distancing from the central governments? We shall observe reactions 
(generated by the EU structure) of disintegrative regional public-representation groups; 
more precisely, consequences of the appearance of institutional structures for regional 
administration of EU funds.    
Chapter II – Theoretical approach:  
I have tried to establish which EU theoretical framework would coherently explain ”the 
discourse of fragmentation according to which the nation-state is being eroded by the 
emergence and re-emergence of cleavages among ethnic, cultural and religious lines.”25 In 
that sense, “multi-level governance can generate testable hypotheses to guide empirical 
research, the findings from which can lead to further research questions”26. Also, the MLG 
perspective has tended to focus on SNAs (sub-national authorities).
27
  
I will discuss MLG and Regionalism and explain how they can be used to explore the 
current case study. The two studied regions share a different identity, similarities with 
another country or region and an emphasized desire to control their own finances. Also, 
they consider that national governments do not pursue the regional interest, they project the 
future as a stronger collaboration with the EU and they display a strong regional-ethnical 
interest in the EU funds. These are the characteristics developed in the empirical part – 
peculiarities of areas which are blending national and European levels while building webs 
of unilateral transnational interaction in the detriment of the state.   
Consequently, I have divided and processed the most important characteristics of MLG in 
a structure explicitly focused on understanding regional agency and the context around it:  
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1. Basic general characteristics of MLG  
MLG claims that power sharing takes place within three levels of government and that 
there are different designs through which the power is intertwined.
28
 
There are three main principles of the MLG theory regarding its applicability to the EU. 
The first argues for joint decision-making disputed by agents placed in different regional 
levels and not absorbed by state governments. The second refers to consensual decision-
making among member states which implies a deficit of authority from central 
governments. The third claims that political platforms are intertwined in both a formal and 
informal manner and not necessarily enclosed; regional actors have access to national and 
EU arenas facilitating lobby in their course of action and national governments are no 
longer as effective as gate-keepers.
29
 Gary Marks describes MLG as a pattern of perpetual 
bargaining among acknowledged governments at different territorial levels from 
supranational to local. It is the outcome of a complex development of reallocation of 
decisions and emergence of institutions.
30
 MLG also draws attention towards the 
legitimacy of actors placed at different territorial levels. The dichotomy domestic vs. 
international has been re-valued by MLG approach and replaced by the intermestic, 
meaning actors operating at the crossroads of internal and external policy which require 
new ways of cooperation.
31
 The EU-structure has challenged the role of the state, powerful 
decision-making become more spread across different territorial levels
32
 and there is a 
stronger role for non-governmental actors in policy making.
33
 Furthermore, the state has 
lost exclusive direct policy control to network actors which trigger questions about the way 
state power has been challenged and about who holds true democratic accountability. 
Within the EU, functions are formally and informally pushed both upwards to the 
superstructure and downwards towards regional assemblies.
34
 
In certain cases sub-national authorities can only mobilize, while in others they exercise 
real influence.
35
 Nevertheless, it is the EU structure that offers the context for action, the 
                                                          
28
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structure where paradoxically “globalization catalysed integration.”36 According to Ian 
Bache it is “Type II multi‐level governance [that] describes governing arrangements in 
which the jurisdiction of authority is task‐specific, where jurisdictions operate at numerous 
territorial levels and may be overlapping.”37 There, authority is more flexible and policy-
making pluralized. One of the main claims about MLG is that the central states cannot 
monopolize governing power but share it with sub-national and supranational actors.
38
 
States still have the main role but MLG affirms that the EU structure decreases that role in 
favour of power-sharing.
39
 Nevertheless, it is primarily goal-driven actors like the nation 
states that agree to readjust in a new context since financial instruments such as the 
structural funds are aimed at their financial development in the process of EU-effect on 
domestic politics.
40
 
I will test the same claims described by MLG on the two cases of autonomist regions. 
Although I expect certain differences, a pattern must arise in the way autonomist regions 
perceive the institution of EU funds. My anticipated conclusion is that autonomist regions 
with separate identity would be tempted to reach an improved status quo if helped by 
bureaucracy and financing. My research is neither on whether they will succeed in 
acquiring those further advantages nor the factual financial impact of the EU funds. It is 
the EU context explained by MLG which provides a platform for action (a further 
alternative to bypass state government), opportunity that is in a way or another valued by 
the autonomists. Within three levels of formal and informal governance, the EU 
bureaucracy can involuntarily be of aid either to the national or to the regional level 
depending on various internal and external circumstances.  
2. The status quo of a region depends on internal characteristics   
A proof of the sophistication of MLG is displayed in the theory’s claim that the nature of 
the EU hinders generalizations and in return calls for empirical research on particular 
topics. Regarding cohesion policy, Hooghe states that the empirical research calls for 
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distinction between member states. There are reasons for the existence of variations in 
regional influence and those reasons are found in the relationship of regional actors with 
the EU which, in turn, depend on national characteristics or inter-level state organization.
41
 
MLG does not make claims about the level of autonomy of sub-national authorities. Such 
findings comprise one of the research-topics MLG studies through empirical research. The 
present thesis shall extend the theory’s understanding upon autonomist regions within the 
EU. Sometimes regional actors are powerful and sometimes they are menial depending on 
the conditions under which they can show influence.
42
 The reasons that influence the 
capability of the state to preserve the gatekeeper-role vary significantly depending on the 
internal characteristics.
43
 Scotland is a region with advanced powers, such as an elected 
regional parliament, a limited right to levy taxes and limited budgetary powers while 
Szeklerland has no powers, no elected regional parliament, no right to levy taxes, no 
budgetary and legislative power and all of its financial resources are transferred from the 
central government.
44
   
The balance swings sometimes on the favour of regional institutions and sometimes in 
favour of national pursuits.
45
 “The factors that affect whether a particular SNA will be 
effective in influencing national European policy are constitutional position, the quality of 
intergovernmental relations within the state, the level of entrepreneurship displayed by the 
SNA (which in turn will be affected by the level of internal institutional adaptation, 
leadership, and the strategies of coalition-building adopted) and the legitimacy of the SNA 
(the extent to which it has the backing of a local/regional population with a strong sense of 
common identity and purpose).”46  
The variations in between regions are much influenced by internal constitutional 
arrangements,
47
 in this case Scotland being devolved since 1998 while Szeklerland is still 
part of a compactly unitary state. The level of entrepreneurship also explains the 
differences in leadership and differential empowerment depending on whether the regional 
                                                          
41
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42
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policy community was present in the region before the arrival of the EU structural funds.
48
 
Regional mobilization can materialize in smaller or larger movements
49
 but the arrival of 
funds changed the balance of power incredibly dissimilarly. Regions can independently 
access EU funds according to their political power or their lobbying abilities within the 
EU.
50
 Therefore, it highly depends among the member states whether their sub-national 
authorities have a say in national European policy; it generally happens if the European 
policy itself somehow already infringes on the national policy-making.
51
 While Scotland 
and Szeklerland differ in regional entrepreneurship and economy, they both count on 
ethnic support for a more separate region.  
Empirical evidence shows that regional interference grew unevenly across the EU
52
 and 
that regional mobilization does not necessarily become regional influence within the 
state.
53
 However, in the case of devolution, MLG explains that the ongoing process has 
relocated competences, created cleavages and started conflicts within state levels.
54
 Multi-
level governance offers great insights into the changes of British politics where devolution 
has facilitated creations of new structures, processes and institutions.
55
 Decentralization 
brings about redistribution of policy-competencies and accountability potential in between 
parliamentary and government bodies
56
 while mostly facilitating the sub-national level.
57
 
It can be claimed therefore that, from one member state to another, governments and 
territorial levels have particular institutional competencies but are also liable to definitions 
of legitimacy which derive from the general conceptualization of how that society should 
be ruled and what are the overall governing relationships within that particular state.
58
  
3. Are the EC and the Regions a team in bypassing the nation state?   
Since the 1990’s the European Commission was able to monitor the way EU funds were 
used at national level. The outcome was a progressive move towards spending on EU 
                                                          
48
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prioritized projects to the detriment of domestic interests and in favour of regional levels.
59
 
Both supranational and the territorial levels have grown in importance in comparison to the 
nation state
60
 while European structure enhances a stronger role for European regions.
61
 
The Commission and the regional actors can use structural policy and its resources to 
improve their status quo in relation to the state government.
62
 Some scholars are even of 
the opinion that the EU also displays a social dimension; although not as strong as a 
welfare state, agricultural and cohesion policy are aimed at helping regions in need and 
excluded societal margins. Still, the EU structure has not overcome the national one, but 
merely created new regulatory patterns.
63
   
The development of MLG entails three steps: “1) as increasing sub-national mobilization 
and involvement in policy-making particularly at the EU level, sustained [...] by the desire 
of (some) sub-national authorities to claim back command over their own destinies […]; 2) 
as increasing transnational social movement activism on “value” issues, welcomed by 
some EU institutional and individual actors as a way of promoting particularly cherished 
agendas […]; and 3) as increasing mobilization and involvement in policy-making of civil 
society organizations at the sub-national level, in turn connected with the growing interest 
of local political classes to engage the problems of their territory and of the new saliency of 
the sub-national territorial level for policy-making.”64 Clearly, information about EU 
business is a strong advantage in domestic negotiation
65
 and some scholars consider that 
within the EU it is even possible to bypass nation state level if addressing supranational 
institutions directly.
66
 
In my view, MLG does not necessarily always empower the regions as much as makes 
them liable to its direct influence. Therefore, in relation to the Commission, regions accept 
both the rights and the responsibilities that come along. The EU-regions relationship 
experiences both ups and downs: in certain cases the regions and the European 
Commission can form a coalition for particular purposes, especially related to fund 
                                                          
59
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spending
67
 (like in the RECHAR case
68
) or when “the Commission encourages lobbying 
by sub-national groups to obtain sources of information and to strengthen the 
communautaire spirit;”69 in other cases the relationship can prove conflictual like in 
between Saxony Land and the EC.
70
 Still, this implies that the EU can be seen as a helping 
platform for the two regions. As the national state is not perceived to represent their 
interests, they are developing relations with the EU and similar neighbouring regions.  
4. MLG and matters of legitimacy in the EU 
I agree that “MLG arrangements contribute to EU democracy in a number of ways: 1) they 
entrench the right of the “peripheries” to be involved in decisions that concern their 
material and cultural destiny (the “grass roots”); 2) they do so in such a way (“loose 
coupling”) as to avoid the deadlock that is normally associated even with cooperative 
federalist settings in which each actor has veto power over the final decision; and 3) they 
foster the creation of more organic ties between sub-national authorities and their local 
societies that tend to produce locally responsive outputs”.71  
While nation-states develop hard politics, MLG argues for the fact that implementation is 
most accurately felt by the individuals living in the territorial level mainly preoccupied 
with soft politics.
72
 Sub-national authorities are gaining more credibility with their claims 
of representing the populations of the regions and their power increases with their lobbying 
skills.
73
 In other words there is a developing relationship between informality of lobbying 
and inequality in EU politics regarding territorial level.
74
 On the other hand, nation states 
are rather critical of the MLG procedure since it implies a decrease in their control 
competencies while increasing their liability when complying with EU policies, regulations 
and institutional demands.
75
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5. Autonomist and different-identity regions 
Selcen Öner states that “sub-national regions rarely try to displace states or take over state 
functions.” Nevertheless, “is the policy of the many [...] nationalist groups” to try to 
“replace the existing Union with a federation of regions and small nations.”76 Especially if 
alimented by ethnic and cultural peculiarities, regional governments became more 
aggressive in their relationship with the nation state. They may try to achieve a place on 
EU-level and circumvent national governments.
77
 From a monetary perspective though, 
they count both on supra-national support and state welfare.
78
 “A region’s separate 
purposes can be: to recognise special linguistic or ethnic features; to limit central 
government’s power over autonomous areas; and to establish a territorial framework which 
is suited to the needs of economic administration”79 together with increasing its planning 
powers.   
Within and due to fragmentation, territorially organized sub-state entities such as 
autonomous regions and non-state actors, for e.g. ethnic minorities, actively try to 
”increase their sovereign powers to possibly attain title over the territory they occupy, most 
commonly by appealing to the right of self-determination.” Still, their capacities and 
motives strongly fluctuate.
80
 At a micro-level, the desire for a stronger status quo within 
the state is highly related to the capacity of local communities to make their voices heard.
81
 
6. Structural funds  
EU funds policy-domains have reactivated the sub-regional in the recent past.
82
 Even the 
concept of MLG itself emerged from Gary Marks’ study on Structural Policy.83 
The appearance of semi-independent market-related patterns has boosted fragmentation 
throughout the EU and gave rise to an elaborated bureaucratic dominion.
84
 The allocation 
of structural funds given for the development of disadvantaged regions was the main 
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incentive for national governments to accept the Commission’s idea that the funds would 
be distributed through sub-national cooperation mostly in between the EC and regional or 
local levels.
85
 Although the traditional role of states would be to govern the economy, 
under EU rules for funds distribution that function became from many points of view, 
volatile.
86
 Also, national governments sometimes follow goals that require adjustments, 
even when involving the unwanted re-establishment of hierarchies of authority. But once 
new institutions have been put in place with responsibilities transferred to them, a new 
status-quo has already been created.
87
 That is the moment MLG emerges. In all of the three 
formal and informal mixed levels, EU funds flow represents a crucial re-motivation for 
lobbying, negotiation and policy-making. Sub-national authorities at that point have the 
resources to increase their autonomy from the national government. The resources 
provided by the European Commission act both as incentive and means in order to 
maximize the use of what EU fund policy can offer. Once a policy sector becomes 
influenced by the EU, new resources become available and new levels have already 
appeared.
88
 It is incredibly attractive for actors at the regional level in the two regions to 
have a direct link with influential and resourceful supranational institutions. Regions are 
aware of the monetary resources that the EU funds can add to their budgets
89
 and social 
policy (welfare) becomes equivalent to economic policy (funds).
90
 
New Regionalism and Regionalism and Supranationalsim   
In addition to Multi-level Governance, the Regionalism-Supranationalism theoretical 
approach also depicts regional tensions and changing structures of influence, majorly 
related to funds accession. Therefore, for the purpose of a more complete and refined 
academic insight, I have selected an additional piece of Regionalism approach to reinforce 
the MLG theoretical backbone of the thesis.
 91
 Although it is MLG that offers the best 
overview, regionalism depicts a few key insights more detailed; the regional dimension is 
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intended to accurately reflect the cultural and national divisions within Europe.
92
 On the 
same line as MLG, New Regionalism states that Regions are not being created uniformly 
within the EU.
93
  
Like in my two cases, a”strong regionalism is where political institutions can build on 
a distinct culture and identity” which can climax in a separatist or disintegrative regional 
autonomy: actors pursuing interests in a bilateral zero sum game.
94
 They are the “territories 
or populations with a distinct set of historical, linguistic characteristics.”95  
As the world economy becomes more integrated, it is more difficult to control a state’s 
functional development from the capital. Moreover, in places where local differences such 
as ethnic, linguistic, cultural or historical peculiarities exist, it is more likely that a political 
demand for increased autonomy and federalism would be displayed.
96
 
As the nation state is challenged by too many functions and must share competencies, the 
regional and supranational levels are occasionally prone to forming strategic alliances 
against the middle level. While in federal states like Germany growth of regional power 
was naturally embedded in the status quo, in unitary states it led to tensions.
97
 In my cases, 
Romania is a unitary state while the UK is unitary de jure but decentralized de facto, due to 
the pressure for devolution. Actors that feel disadvantaged by the national structure in 
matters of economic growth, employment etc, perceive the structural funds as alternatives. 
Moreover, when resentment and different interests collide in between national and local 
structures, direct decision making becomes incredibly appealing.
98
  
Regionalism argues that smaller units are more responsive to the local individual (more 
electorate-sensitive and endowed with local distinctiveness) while primary group 
attachment such as regional connection based on cultural, tradition, social practices and 
historical ties creates a community sense of identity and desire for own decision-making, 
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as opposed to the desire to build a strong state in matters of security, economic 
development and influence on the international arena.
99
 Regionalism can appear as a 
method of promoting economical development, as a demand for self governance or as a 
demand for policy concessions or local autonomy.  
Top-down reforms tend to promote the most competitive regions in order to advertise 
indigenous attractions on the international market for even further development, and may 
turn into a zero sum game
100
 when coming across mobilization at the ground (referendums, 
social movements arguing for regional knowledge and asking for different paths of 
development etc).
101
 A counter example is the case of rejectionist regionalists: for example 
Scandinavian peripheries that want to keep the equalitarian welfare system are quite 
attached to the idea of nation state.
102
  
EU integration changed territorial politics especially since economic growth has reshaped 
the political agendas. Territorial disparities are more obvious in an integrated market and 
new territorial hierarchy is being formed both in the EU and at country levels. EU Regional 
policy can act as a reward while a partnership with the EC increases mobilization and 
raises expectations. Therefore, the EU has provided what I will later conceptualize as the 
means to a fruitful arena for the aspirations of minority nationalists. Some regions even 
want to secede as a region and rejoin as member state. Minority regionalists (defined by 
common language, historic memories, pre-state past and myths) seek a more natural and 
more participative level. Nevertheless, as actors, regions (especially disintegrative) are 
unlikely to be uncontested. In addition to acquiring an advantageous position on the 
European market which is vital for any region, autonomist ones try to use Europe to loosen 
the control of the state (e.g.: Scotland, Tirol etc). In addition to that, when feeling that the 
economic change is not entirely dependent on the state anymore, regions seek alternatives. 
Additionally, member states may at times sacrifice regional interests to get a package deal 
(e.g.: for fisheries in the UK) while regional offices in Brussels give the chance to develop 
narratives for project proposals. Brussels offices are also preferred since the Committee of 
Regions is a rather weak body instead of the hoped second legislative chamber. But the 
Commission has an interest in partnership with regional representatives mainly from the 
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structural funds point of view. In that sense, poor regions rely both on national and EU 
funding.
103
 Still, whether they are poor territorial units clinging to fiscal centralization or 
rich decentralist territories, a separate ethnic aspect has a huge potential to emphasize 
desired changes in the status quo.
104
 Since the Single European Act, EU matters have lost 
the exclusive foreign policy character,
105
 and places with ethnic specificity
106
 are quite 
prone to attract development means that would enhance the regional quality of life.
107
 
Regions that are successful at national level are also more likely to be successful in 
Brussels;
108
 still, a lack of cover from the state also exposes them to potential hits from the 
market (e.g.: Szeklerland).
109
 With the European Commission insisting on aditionality and 
transparency to make sure that it is not the states’ treasuries receiving the funds, a powerful 
mobilization on the ground was encouraged.
110
 Some countries (e.g. Romania) even had to 
establish updated regional structures in order to qualify for funds.
111
 Within the EU, due to 
the principle of subsidiarity, funds managing authorities directly receive the payments 
made by the Commission.
112
 Information, selection of projects, payment and supervision
113
 
are performed by the appointed MA.
114
 On the ground implementation of ERDF depends 
on intermediate authorities which are the main contact bodies with the beneficiaries.
115
 
”The Scottish Government is the Managing Authority for Structural Funds in Scotland and 
has overall responsibility for supervising the implementation, ongoing management and 
effectiveness of the programmes.”116 Unlike in Romania,117 the MA of Regional Policy in 
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the UK is not a single national institution; there are two MAs covering only Scotland.
118
 
The regional impact of EU funds in Scotland is rather noticeable and displays no great 
novelty. Only the Scottish Co-investment Fund started in 2003 and partly funded by the 
ERDF
119
 benefited of £27m within the Structural Fund Programmes. Another money flow 
of £29m ERDF came in 2008 making it acknowledged an exemplar fund by the European 
Commission and the European Investment Fund.
120
 
In Romania until the present reform, the public administration was dominated by vertical-
hierarchical political culture and institutional practice.
121
 During decentralization, 
competencies are transferred to the regional level. National teritorial-administrative units 
defined by legal personality will from 2014 on coincide with the EU NUTS2  regions 
covered by Regional Development Agencies (implementation units
122
) which supervise the 
whole implementation process,
123
 are in direct contact with the EC,
124
 closer to the 
citizens
125
 and perform a faster bureaucracy.
126
   
Therefore, according to MLG and Regionalism, national and regional circumstances matter 
but the overall reality is dominated by a true potential for power shifts between the three 
EU governance levels. 
Before deciding on MLG and Regionalism, I also examined four other valid theories but 
considered them not to be the best reflection of autonomist EU regions. Neofunctionalism: 
I appreciated the elements that Neofunctionalism shares with MLG, namely the idea of 
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alliance between the supranational and the regional in the detriment of the national; yet, it 
does not depict the reality of my case-studies and claims that the link is a one direction 
uniform spill-over that decreases state sovereignty instead of varying majorly from case to 
case.
127
 Rational Choice Theory: this proposes the idea of economic behaviour which 
could explain reactions towards EU funding but it did not fully match since: 1. autonomist 
regions also have other considerations to take into account than pure numbers and 2. I 
would have needed more detailed data on the resources available to actors during a wider 
time frame than 2007-present. Public image of funds can suffer serious modifications 
during seven years but documented statements on resources require a wider time span. “If 
multi-level governance is to develop as a branch of rational choice analysis, it needs a 
stronger theory of the resources available to actors.”128 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
argues that cohesion policy has a role in inter-state competitiveness rather than in internal 
social goals.
129
 Finally, New Medievalism claims similarity with the pre-Westphalia order. 
It is a suitable theory due to stating that: fragmentation erodes the power of the state in the 
favour of actors placed under and above it, economical globalization destabilizes borders, 
institutionalization of global structures emerge, institutional authorities compete,
130
 there is 
a “system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty [and a] decentralized network of 
socio-political relationships [...] held together by the antagonistic organizational claims of 
the nation-state system and the transnational market economy.”131 Yet, despite the 
explanatory potential, I opted out using New Medievalism since it focused on the global 
macrolevel,
132
 the American global empire
133
 and trade beyond the state
134
 rather than the 
sub-national dimension.   
In conclusion, it is states that control foreign policy but the EU level is not simply a matter 
of foreign policy anymore. Although European integration has the role of regional well-
being, it is not time for the Europe of Regions yet. That is the main reason why MLG still 
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encapsulates the three dimensional character of the present EU phenomenon best
135
 which 
will in the current thesis be tested on autonomist regions.    
Chapter III – Methodology and Material: 
The methodology used in this thesis is Qualitative Data Analysis and more exactly 
Grounded Theory. The advantage of QDA is the interpretation of themes supported by 
data,
136
 it allows for categories to emerge from data and most importantly it best captures 
the richness, variety, and individuality of nuanced data. GT methods create a process of 
building theory up from the data itself.
137
 According to Grounded Theory, the researcher 
begins with an inductive approach on the data related to a phenomenon in order to generate 
wording codes; second, the still-developing theory will require further relevant data and 
will suggest more-focussed questions to ask, which simultaneously represents the 
deductive phase of the GT method.
138
 Moreover, abductive reasoning occurs during all 
stages of analysis due to the constant comparative analysis in between categories which 
eventually lead to theoretical integration. (Appendix 3)  
Groups of open codes generate core categories (in this case the subtitles of the empirical 
chapter). Further, categories can only be theoretically saturated when new data analysis 
returns codes that only fit in existing categories, and these categories are sufficiently 
explained in terms of their properties, conditions that a particular category may exist under, 
the dimensions of a category or the relationship between categories. When linking the 
categories by using abductive logic, the researcher tests if the hypothesis remains 
unmodified when tested on new empirical cases.
139
 Therefore, due to mild autonomist 
regions as Normandy or Bavaria not fitting in the hypothesis, this led me to narrow down 
the concept describing my focus regions to a specific kind of autonomists: “ethnic 
disintegrative regions which are not eurosceptic.”   
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In more detail, the methodological GT process started with sampled data (from media 
reports, the EU, government and organisations documents) which I then open coded
140
 and 
axial coded,
141
 all under constant comparative analysis while adding further data until 
categories started to emerge. Selective coding then reshaped the core categories and led to 
patterns, which triggered theoretical saturation (when new data does not change the 
emerging theory). The categories coincide with the subtitles of the empirical chapter, the 
theory is saturated by encompassing non-eurosceptic ethnic disintegrative regions and 
the patterns discovered are revealed in the conclusion.   
The aim of the methodology is for the core categories to lead to an explanation of how the 
main phenomenon is dealt with and processed. GT is most of all “comprehensive because 
it includes variation rather than assuming there is a one-size-fits-all answer to a research 
question.” The conclusion of a research using GT is like a storyline, it basically “explains a 
process or scheme associated with a phenomenon.”142 The categories were formed by 
explaining the consequences of the appearance of institutional structures for regional 
administration of EU funds. The studied phenomenon (and the gap in research that I am 
trying to fill) is reactions of disintegrative regional public-representation groups, 
generated under EU structure. Therefore, validity in its traditional sense is not an issue 
in GT, which instead should be judged by fit. A GT is never right or wrong, it just has 
more or less fit, relevance, workability and modifiability.
143
 
The research design is comparative case study, known in social and especially political 
sciences, as an analysis through creating themes and making assertions.
144
 Most studies 
that attempt theoretical analysis of social phenomena by examining similarities or 
differences are comparative; comparing several societies with different types of 
characteristics enables conclusions to be drawn.
145
 I argue that this was the most suitable 
design since it led to a persuasive response to the research question and opened the 
possibility for the measurements to be replicated on other cases. By using across-case-
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development analysis of themes, aspects that were either common or different across the 
two cases were pointed out by the holistic analysis. The empirical categories were 
interpreted by using appropriate verbatim quotes.
146
 Various characteristics and autonomist 
attitudes related to the EU were coded in the subtitles and compared between the cases so 
as to assert the different extents to which each region was fulfilling each criterion. The aim 
was capturing views, motivations, and experiences and explaining the meaning the two 
regions make of them.
147
 
In my research I chose two regions from very different EU countries in order to test the 
institutional and financial multi-level impact of the EU on autonomist regions. I chose the 
“Most Different” Systems Design since it uncovers what was common enough to explain 
similar developments.
148
 In other words, it is a study in which the differences are irrelevant 
in relation to the mutual characteristic/the dependent variable.
149
 A competent MDSD 
proves that similar outcomes can be conceptualized in the end, beyond the obvious 
differences.
150
  
Regarding material, I used qualitative text analysis on national and regional media 
sources and on the main regional public-representation groups in the studied regions, 
especially the two most representative ones: Yes Scotland 
(www.yesscotland.net/) and Szekler National Council (http://www.sznt.ro). Such types of 
sources may not be numerous but they are key variables in understanding the case-studies 
in relation to the topic. Yes Scotland is set up by the Scottish Government while SNC is an 
association of 17 (and increasing
151
) local councils supporting the autonomy of 
Szeklerland.
152
 Other sources are the Scottish Government, the Scottish Parliament, 
Scotland Europa etc. Even the Scottish National Party is used as a source as it is dominant 
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in the present government so it is likely its policy line will reflect in the mainstream 
direction of Scotland. Also, mainstream newspapers were used: Financial Times, EU 
Observer, BBC, Adevarul, Gandul, Romania Libera, Curierul National etc. 
The time frame of the study is January 2007-May 2013, from the moment Romania 
became an EU member state until three months before the thesis’ deadline. Regarding data 
collection, I found the above-mentioned material for the empirical analysis by using key 
words highly relevant to the topic in Google search – in combination with “Scotland” the 
search key words (in English) were: ”independence, referendum, EU funds, devolution, 
regional level, regional representation, EU membership, resources, economy and 
Brussels.” In combination with “Szeklerland” the key words (in Romanian) were: 
Hungarians, Szeklers, regionalisation, EU funds, autonomy, self-organisation, EU 
membership, resources, economy and Brussels.” These key words brought about numerous 
un-envisioned sub-themes in the topic which will be presented in the results section. Also, 
by noticing that, while taking turns in using the mentioned key words, the material found 
overlapped with itself within the broad theme, I consider to have exhausted most known 
publications on the referendum for independence in Scotland and the autonomy within 
regionalisation in Szeklerland.
153
 During the coding process, I open coded first and then I 
focussed on related recurring codes (axial coding) to turn them into sub-themes/categories. 
The material used solely for the empirical part summed up: official statements of the 
regional representation groups, numerous articles from approximately 35 different online 
newspapers and media publications (the international and national most popular but also 
the very regional ones),
154
 selected by exhausting the articles that came up after using the 
key words for the topic, all making up around 80 different sources for both cases.       
Moreover, the study included the up-to-date state of the art regarding the secondary 
literature of interactions between Scotland and the EU for the purpose of making a proper 
comparison to Szeklerland. One of the main works was The Regional Dimension of the 
European Union-Towards a Third Level in Europe? edited by Charlie Jeffery. Published 
one year before the Scottish devolution, the source gives insight of key steps that have the 
potential to be repeating in Szeklerland in time. Also, writings of David Cameron, Michaël 
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Tatham, Michael Keating, Ian Bache, Selcen Öner and Gary Marks have introduced me 
into what it had already been researched on the topic: the interests and stages related to the 
EU funds in the process of regionalization have been until now looked at through the 
comparison of “unitary versus federal state,” mostly UK versus Germany. The studies 
concluded that the gatekeeper role of the British government had been weakened by the 
structural and regional policy of the EU and that a unitary administration (more than a 
federal one) will be eroded by the cooperation in between the EC and regional levels.
155
 
While devolution changed the unitary character of the UK, rigorous researches comparing 
disintegrative autonomists in the EU is still practically missing. As I was aiming for a new 
approach, previous scholar information on Scotland was relatively easy to find as opposed 
to the one on Szeklerland, where there is almost nothing of scholar character available to 
the general public and where I had to consider the linguistic differences (the resources 
being mostly in Romanian and translated by me).  
Unless otherwise stated, throughout the entire Results chapter the presented view is the 
autonomist one, since the key words attracted mostly the opinion of the disintegrative 
regionalists rather than of the national state.  
Although an important part of the sources were media texts, I choose not to use content 
analysis since it encompassed the risk of missing the overall sense of communications 
since it only offers quantitative summaries of the content. Any communication evokes a 
feeling, an overall impression, or a sense that cannot be captured simply by counting the 
frequency with which certain items appear
156
 and so the categorized data risks becoming 
largely decontextualized. 
Potential limitations: most of the sources for the practical part were online newspapers, 
media articles and dominant regional manifestos due to the on-going character of the 
events. Still, this characteristic represents more of a peculiarity than a real limitation since 
novelty also makes an advantage. 
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Chapter IV – Findings:     
While studying the empirical material according to the presented method and research 
design, I identified six most recurrent themes which made the top concerns of both 
autonomist regions studied in relation to the EU and its funds. Each category exhibits the 
findings from each region while making a direct or implied comparison, depending on the 
context. 
a) Separate identities:  
The Hungarian minority in Romania concentrated in the centre of the country and 
comprising seven per cent
157
 of the total population, aims at creating an autonomous region 
in which, among others, Hungarian would be the official language.
158
 In that sense, 
Szeklerland would be comprised of the Hungarian-inhabited part of Mures County and the 
less modernized Covasna and Harghita counties.
159
 In the petition to create Szeklerland, 
they mention similar cases such as: “Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Catalonia, Basque 
Land, Galicia, South Tirol, Corsica, Bretagne, Frisian Provence, Valle d’Aosta, Friuli-
Venezia Giulia”160 as further examples of similar values and interests.  
In the case of the Scots, comprising 10.08 percent of the UK population,
161
 language 
difference does not constitute a major claim. Although part of the same political system as 
England for 300 years, it maintained its own legal system and strong self-administrative 
powers.
162
 Some sources even claim that after the 1998 devolution in the UK, the state 
adopted a quasi-federal structure and has been unitary only on paper (asymmetrical 
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federalism).
163
   
While Romania is a state with no devolved powers to local administrations
164
 and “with a 
combination of a majoritarian system of representation, statist policy‐making processes 
and a unitary state structure,”165 the Scottish Government has under its jurisdiction 
education, the judicial system, the health system, transportation and rural affairs, handling 
a budget of approximately 25 billion pounds per year.
166
 Defence and foreign policy on the 
other hand, including participation at the EU level
167
 are subordinated to the central 
government in Westminster.
168
 Regarding the Quality of Government enjoyed (understood 
as low corruption and as high protection of the rule of law, government effectiveness and 
accountability), the Centre Region in Romania scores 30.09 while Scotland 89.60.
169
 Yet, 
Bucharest scores less than the Centre Region which raises a point on the compensating 
feeling of belonging that will be further discussed in the next chapter;
170
 “decentralization 
is not consistently linked with [...] higher levels of QoG.”171    
Furthermore, while Romania is rather pro-EU across the entire state and fairly drawn by 
the idea of structural funds, Scotland makes a separate case for not being Eurosceptic like 
most of the UK.
172
 Such strategic difference pushes Scotland towards seeking a path of its 
own: ''David Cameron’s proposal for an in/out referendum on the UK’s membership of the 
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European Union has underlined that the threat to Scotland’s place in Europe lies not with 
independence but with an increasingly Eurosceptic Westminster.”173 Polls have proven that 
Scottish people are in strong support of continued EU membership and perceive it as a path 
in favour of Scottish national interest while England is a supporter of leaving the EU.
174
 
Those pro-independence emphasize this fact as a need for bypassing an undecided national 
government while enhancing direct relationship with the European Union. Circumstances 
where the Eurosceptic Tory Party and the Prime Minister himself are drafting options such 
as fewer areas of cooperation with other member states and a potential full exit from the 
EU,
175
 emphasize the party-line separation existent in the British society and facilitates a 
turn towards ethnic parties. The same phenomenon is observable in Romania where the 
Hungarian population votes mostly on ethnic criteria.
176
  
Consequently, in the two areas societal cleavages (different ethnographical background, 
linguistic nature, matters of power-sharing between the national and regional level, 
orientation towards the future within the European Union etc) explain amplification of a 
separate identity and a trend in attempting MLG power-shifts since it implies state 
decentralization.       
b) Belonging towards another societal model:  
In the named Szeklerland, the local councils forming the Szekler National Council argue 
for similarity with South Tirol.
177
 They recommend autonomy based on that similar model 
and emphasize separate education, economy and language both as minority rights that 
should prevail over the decisions of the national level and as a means of ensuring equality 
in a region that is dually claimed within public administration, judicial system and use of 
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toponimes.
178
   
Since the UK at present is the one of  ”the fourth most unequal society in the developed 
world,”179 supporters of Scottish independence want to pursue the Nordic welfare state 
model where ''social justice leads to social cohesion, and social cohesion […] is a building 
block of economic success.''
180
 And while Scotland ventures Nordic-like economic 
planning, Great Britain is the adept of economic liberalism and radical capitalism.
181
 In this 
sense, Scotland aspires at breaking the limitations of the kingdom by looking towards 
another geographical orientation and by endeavouring bypassing limitations on 
decisions.
182
 
One claim of pro-independence advocates is improving the situation of marginal groups 
such as women, the old and the young, who as shown in GDP statistics, are still 
disadvantaged under an only-devolved system of governance.
183
 They state that, unlike in 
an equalitarian society: Scotland within the UK suffers some of the very worst levels of 
inequity and poverty in the developed world.
184
 
The co-investment model that Scotland has introduced was taken as example “in other 
countries like: England, Wales, Sweden, New Zealand and Canada.”185 The National 
Health Service is placed under the devolved Scottish Government. The Scottish National 
Party (majoritarian in the present pro-independence government) announces an opposition 
of views in between them and the Tory Party who are adepts of NHS privatization and 
profit in the detriment of public welfare. So, if privatization hits the rest of the UK, it shall 
not hit Scotland.
186
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Scotland is increasingly projecting its ideal future in the Nordic welfare, in small nations’ 
model and nations living within another state. They started a quest for an improved 
political economy which can only occur under increased regional potential.
187
 In a general 
orientation towards enhanced responsibility, the supporters of independence count on a 
legitimate liable Parliament and Government in the strive for an ethnic regional economic 
plan, circumventing the powers attributed to the national government and providing 
“Scottish solutions to Scottish problems.”188  
Scotland will emphasize inclusion, reasonable growth and align with the Europe 2020 
strategy
189
and will follow their envisioned model, Scandinavia,
190
 as in parallel (although 
without offering much detail about it) Szeklerland argues that it follows South Tirol.  
c) Regional Economy:  
While asserting the overall potential for a more extended degree of autonomy for the 
regions in the case studies, it is absolutely crucial to consider the status of their internal 
economy.   
In Szeklerland, the regional financial situation ranks below the Romanian national average. 
Only one out of three inhabitants of Harghita, Covasna and Mures counties has a defined 
occupation and only one out of five is employed. Romanian newspaper “Adevarul” created 
a hypothetical feasibility test based on national official statistics arguing that from a 
macroeconomic point of view the self-established region could not support itself 
financially and its bureaucracy if it were a state, without massive debts. If Szeklerland 
were an independent state, the poor economy would become dependent on loans while the 
population would live in a new country where the GDP per capita would score 5.000 Euros 
(Appendix 4). Furthermore most of its geographical structure (75%) is composed by 
mountain terrain, so the main resources in agriculture would be obtained from animal 
farms and cultivating legumes (both sectors with minor economic production). Moreover, 
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with rather little industry, the main income of the land could be summed up by tourism, 
mineral waters and wood processing.  
According to Adevarul newspaper, only in 2013 Romania had to balance the low VAT 
budget of Mures, Harghita and Covasna counties with 108.9 million RON (about 25 
million Euros), an amount aimed at keeping an equilibrium in between the local income 
and the local expense. Also, the calculated hypothetical currency would display an 
exchange rate of 1.000 SIC (Szeklerland currency) for three Euros.
191
 
Another county income study was endeavoured by Gandul newspaper. Without a special 
focus on Szeklerland, the source established that in 2011 the percentage of welfare money 
received from the Romanian state from the amount it had been paid as taxes summed up to: 
70,7% for Mures County, 78.8% for Covasna County and 82.5% for Harghita County. As a 
counter-example, the most developed region in Romania (the capital) received from the 
state budget 11.2 to 15.9% from the taxes it had paid.
192
  
In the same kind of report for the year 2010, the same Gandul newspaper mentions the 
declaration of the head of Harghita County Council who claims that it is not important who 
receives more national funds. Also the president of Harghita County Council, Borboly 
Csaba, an supporter of Szeklerland autonomy remarks that the desired attitude is to reach 
those in need. As a wrap-up, Gandul newspaper enunciates that according to their 
calculations based on the dates provided by the Ministry of Public Finances, Harghita 
County received back from the Romanian state 59.5% of taxes closely followed by 
Covasna County  with 60,5%.
193
 
In conclusion, from the three counties which would make up Szeklerland, Mures County is 
the one placed on an economical national average while Harghita and Covasna are under 
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the country’s midpoint regarding unemployment rate, number of employees, GDB per 
capita and salary range
194 
(Appendices 5-8).     
To the pessimistic statistics presented by the national documents, a supporter of 
Szeklerland, Szasz Jeno, the president of the Hungarian Civic Party replied:”Let Bucharest 
not worry for us, […] let us die in our poverty.” Furthermore, he argues that he does not 
believe in the accuracy of the data. His statement ends with saying that the people in 
Szeklerland were provoked by the proposal of dividing Romania in only eight regions.
195
 
Regarding the debate on the factual ongoing regionalization, besides opposing an ethnic 
regional divide, the Romanian side also opposes the Hungarian proposal for administrative 
reform due to a large number of small region units for NUTS2 and a predicted huge 
discrepancy in their economical sustainability. Poor regions like the mainly-rural parts of 
Romania (including Szeklerland) will remain behind rich regions like the other half of the 
Centre Region from which the Hungarian minority would want to secede as an EU 
Region.
196
 In general, the poor counties in the country display great hopes in the European 
funds.
197
 
To conclude, several factors can create demands for regional autonomy: different stages of 
urbanization, education, political leadings, economic state but also questions of legitimacy 
of the state as explained by MLG.
198
 
Moving the focus towards Scotland, the state of the regional economy has a totally 
different potential than Szeklerland. Similar to the debates on economy presented above, in 
the case of Scotland within the UK, there are also statistics from both sides, making 
assertions on present and future numbers.   
Yes Scotland affirms that “a £250 million annual saving [would be achieved simply] from 
no longer contributing to the cost of the UK’s nuclear weapons.” Moreover, “there will be 
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a £50 million annual saving from no longer paying for the Westminster Parliament.”199 
Additional statistics from the Scottish Government show that there is little difference 
between Scotland and the UK average in recent years GDP per capita (year 2010), 
unemployment rate (year 2012) and net fiscal balance (years 2010-2011).
200
 There is also 
little difference in average annual GDP growth rates,
201
 in comparative GDP weights,
202
 in 
Scottish and UK performance over Recession,
203
 in Scotland's share of UK Public 
Spending and share of UK Receipts.
204
 Also there is a rather positive Scottish Net Fiscal 
Balance in comparison with the UK
205
 while the UK Continental Shelf and Illustrative 
Scottish Boundary display a majority of UK waters belonging to Scotland,
206
 a discrepancy 
in GVA per Hour Worked,
207
 a lower Dependency Ratio in Scotland than in the UK,
208
 a 
close to EU Gross Expenditure on Research and Development in 2001-2010,
209
 around 11 
billion pounds from international exports towards EU 27 in 2011
210
 and a bigger devolved 
taxation under the Scotland Act 2012 than in the interval 2010-2011.
211
 Moreover, while 
asserting the significant balance between generated taxes and income from the state, Yes 
Scotland explains that the 2011-2012 Government Expenditure and Revenue figures 
demonstrate that while Scottish people make up 8.4-10% of the country’s population, they 
also brought about 9.9% of UK taxes in 2012 and 9.6% in 2011, from which they were 
offered from the national fund for running services 9.3% of UK public spending. Figures 
for the last two years show that Scotland contributes £4.4 billion more in comparison to the 
rest of the UK.
212
 Furthermore, an Estimate of Scotland’s GDP per Capita Ranking shows 
Scotland (including a share of the North Sea output) placed in the 6
th
 place with 41.189 
dollars GDP per head in 2010 while the UK lies in the 16
th
 place with just 35.715 dollars 
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GDP per head in the same year.
213
  
On the other side, supporters of a unitary UK claim that the driving forces of separatist 
ideas are not of economic nature since Scotland is not one of the most competitive areas of 
Britain; they may not even be able to support the state structures running, as Roland Sturm, 
political scientist at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg stated.
214
 In addition to that, EU 
Observer uses the story of two main Scottish banks nearing bankruptcy which were saved 
by £80 billion influx from the British Treasury just in 2008. Also, the Scottish National 
Party emphasizes the oil values in Scottish waters but the general amount is decreasing and 
oil prices are unreliable. Still, what Scotland aims at for the future is developing research 
in wind and wave renewable energy.
215
 
Beyond the material I gathered from the media and official resources, the interactive 
Eurostat Statistical Atlas – Regional Yearbook 2012 provides a very useful and user-
friendly interface for comparing any NUTS2. In addition to the statistics already presented, 
it is also worth mentioning: the minimum percentage of long life learning education in 
Szeklerland (less than 20%) compared to 40 to 50% in Scotland; same noticeable 
differences in female employment rate (less than 50% compared to– more than 65%), 
elderly employment rate (less than 35% compared to more than 50%); smaller change in 
unemployment rate and higher youth and long term unemployment rate in Szeklerland than 
in Scotland; regional business concentration varies from less than 37% in Szeklerland to 
just under 50% in Scotland; tourism intensity spreads within a range of less than 2000 
tourists (Szeklerland) to 3500-10.000 tourists per 1000 inhabitants in Scotland; the share of 
agriculture in the economy scores more than 3.5% of the value added in all Romania 
except the capital region while in Scotland it goes down to maximum 1.5% in the Low 
Lands; likewise, proportion of research displays two concentration areas in Scotland, with 
income from maritime goods versus none in Szeklerland; and predominantly rural regions 
in Szeklerland while an almost equal distribution of rural, small and big urban regions in 
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Scotland.
216
   
The main conclusion of this section is first of all that Scotland is unarguably financially 
superior to Szeklerland and therefore would have a higher chance of supporting its own 
independent state; my secondary conclusion is related to the form of the data – while 
selecting material about resources for comparison, I noticed that supporters of Szeklerland 
mostly comment on statistics made by their opponents while the bureaucratic structures of 
Scotland (regardless of their view on independence) have solid accounts on the region’s 
economy. Therefore, beyond the factual numbers and hierarchy presented between the two 
case-study regions, it is also rather intuitive to assert which has a better regional 
bureaucratic structure to support its claims based on the amount of preparation spend on 
the plan of improving the status quo.     
d) The importance of “an ethnic” EU Region:  
Since 2005 (when first rejected by the Chamber of Deputies) there were eleven failed 
attempts on voting for an autonomous Szeklerland in Romania. The latest of them took 
place in September 2012 when the Romanian Senate rejected the referendum legislative 
proposal since, after having received a negative report from the Juridical Commission and 
the Commission for Public Administration in 2009, the draft was unsuccessfully brought 
up during Senate meetings ten other occasions.
217
 
One of the most important implications followed by this thesis in this present 
regionalization of Romania is whether the ethic region of Szeklerland finds the EU-driven 
context a favourable one for their autonomy plans. For the next funding period 2014-2020 
Romania expects 164.279 billion Euros for convergence.
218
 Due to lack of national 
governmental strategy, Romania is currently not absorbing all allocated EU funds.
219
 As it 
is currently in process, the administrative reform started by the EU NUTS2 division, 
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represents both an opportunity for more structural funds throughout the entire country 
(Appendix 9) and, within the domestic arena, a platform for challenging the state-regions 
status quo. The official national perspective in Romania states that the Regions are more 
efficient in applying for structural funds than the central government while less 
dependency of Bucharest and more responsibility towards the specific circumstances they 
know how to manage best can only speed processes up. As the Prime-minister points out, 
the reform is not compulsory but highly recommended by Brussels while the Regional 
Operational Program was the most successfully implemented and proved most observable 
outcome.
220
 Projected to be over during 2013, the regionalization bears high stakes for all 
involved parties since it opens the door towards the new 2014-2020 package of funds from 
the EU budget for Regional Development. This administrative reform triggered by the EU 
structural funds will not only regionalize but also decentralize the country.
221
 The Vice-
prime minister and person in charge with the administrative reform himself, Liviu 
Dragnea, declared that the administrative regions must be fit for a direct partnership with 
the European Commission as an alternative to the Commission dealing only with the 
Central Government. He added that regionalization will decrease waiting time, 
bureaucracy and boost the latent potential of the regions but will not question the unity of 
the Romanian state.
222
 He also added that the people who present different alternatives for 
regionalization than the official one only wish to advertise their image by using the 
confusing context.
223
    
On the other hand, a representative of the most known Hungarian party in Romania states 
that only the autonomy they are fighting for could truly preserve the Szekler traditions, 
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language, culture (Appendices 10-11), decision-making and freedom.
224
 Also, the 
President of the Szekler National Council states that poverty is an effect of centralization 
and lack of independence for the regional economic reserves. The people who do not know 
the peculiarities of the zone cannot draft proper policy for it. Szekler villages, he argues, 
have a great self-organizing capacity towards a particular purpose.
225
 Thus, the 
regionalisation map proposed by a rising Hungarian party divides Romania into 12 smaller 
units, with a view on a historical nine-territories division (Appendix 12) throughout the 
entire country but with Szeklerland and the second-biggest Hungarian inhabited region, 
Partium, within separate administrative structures.
226
 Aware of EU structures facilitating 
autonomy,
227
 representatives of SNC strongly claim that the region with “peculiar 
historical, geographical, political, cultural and economic” characteristics should become its 
own NUTS2 region in order to make most of the EU funds.
228
 It is complicated to find 
ways of direct representation in Brussels in a different direction than the one of the 
member state, and not representing a compact EU Region can deter the purpose 
enormously also since regional offices inform about the availability of different kinds of 
Community funds
229
 and since membership in the CoR is also applied on NUTS2 areas.
230
    
“Although the public is not that aware of it, the benefits of regionalization are the 
European Funds that can be better absorbed for further regional development,” claims a 
supporter of united Covasna, Harghita and Mures counties, Csaba Borboly-politician and 
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CoR member.
231
 
Adevarul newspaper presents an article on the more profound implications of the 
regionalization. Besides other problems Romania faces, creating in 1998 eight regions 
without legal personality which just sum up counties did not lead to the desired better EU 
funds absorption. Its inefficiency was mostly triggered by overlapping of new and old 
borders with no real power given to the former. At the very present, domestic conflict over 
regional interests is aggressive and highly influenced by leaders’ agency.232  
In the other case-study, “the Scottish Government is the 'Managing Authority' for 
Structural Funds in Scotland and has overall responsibility for supervising the 
implementation; ongoing management; and effectiveness of the programmes. In Scotland, 
Structural Funds are the significant source of European Union funding for economic 
development. Programmes run over a seven year period. The 2007 - 2013 Structural Funds 
Programmes are well underway with hundreds of projects across Scotland already 
benefiting from this key funding. The resources being made available are allowing us to 
focus Structural Funds on Scottish priorities and strategies and assist the economy during 
difficult times.”233 Still, international politics comprising among others the European 
Union are under the jurisdiction of the national Government and Parliament, where the 
regions have no real power.
234
 An example could be the RECHAR conflict.
235
  
From a NUTS2 point of view, Scotland covers the convergence region composed of 
Highlands and Islands and 3 Competitiveness and Employment regions representing 
Lowlands and Uplands;
236
 also, it has a great interest in Structural Funds, Agriculture and 
Rural Development, European Fisheries Funds
237
 and in developing low carbon
238
 energy 
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resources, innovation and business. Regarding the management of the Fishery fund (of 
which it received €55 million239), Scotland promotes a strategy of combining the EMFF 
with Structural Funds according to local needs and financing cases peculiar for the area. 
Nevertheless, the EMFF have the implementation negotiated at state level while the 
Structural Funds are under the jurisdiction of the devolved Region; therefore, the mismatch 
in between the two levels makes the desired customized combination of funds very 
unlikely.
240
 It is in such type of situations that the bypassing of the middle MLG level 
increases in appeal for disintegrative autonomists.    
With a view of the Europe 2020 strategy, Scotland is planning a National Reform 
Programme to improve access to European Structural Funds, a sure path to investment and 
financing.
241
 “For the period 2007-13 Scotland has been allocated approximately £1.3 
billion from a number of funds-the European Social Fund, the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the 
European Fisheries Fund. To date these European funds have supported over 1.350 
projects, assisted over 28.000 businesses, created or safeguarded 32.700 jobs and provided 
training and support to over 248.000 individuals.”242 EU funding is a crucial aspect of 
economic growth in Scotland. The difference they make can be seen both in organisations 
and in regular people’s lives and Scotland’s interest is that these funds would continue to 
be absorbed in “in a way that is [...] less bureaucratic for beneﬁciaries.”243 More, as one 
regional profile, Scotland aims to become a beacon of low carbon and green energy 
supplies. In that sense they hope to develop 130.000 more jobs by 2020 by using EU 
funding.
244
 
Besides, what a noticeable part of Scotland argues for is that regional interest would be 
completely subordinated to regional responsibility since a superior national structure that 
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does not know the regional peculiarities only complicates bureaucracy and chooses the 
wrong priorities. On the other hand as claimed by MLG and Regionalism, regional 
responsibility for decision-making strengthens legitimacy and would be more efficient with 
regard to the local interest. That will in return boost commitment with a positive impact on 
economy, reliance and enthusiasm.
245
  
With the purpose of offering the European Commission an insight on Scottish peculiarities 
and the different concepts considered there, the Scottish Government drafted a separate 
Scottish National Reform Programme 2012. Besides the official UK NRP, this separate 
report is closer to the view of the Scottish Government on interacting with EU institutions 
and emphasizes the specific interests and endowment of Scotland
246
 in a greater 
collaboration with the other partner states.
247
 European Funds such as Structural Funds, the 
EAFRD and the EFF “play and will continue to play, a crucial role in delivering 
sustainable growth and accelerating recovery in Scotland. In the light of this the Scottish 
NRP takes the opportunity to highlight how European Funds are currently being used 
across Scotland in order to support the delivery of the ambitions in the Government 
Economic Strategy.”248 Scotland Europa -“a voice for Scotland”249 since 1991- the main 
Scottish representative in Brussels intermediates funding opportunities and facilitate 
European funding for Scottish projects. They provide dissemination of information, 
lobbying, networking and contact with the European Commission. After selecting funding 
opportunities, Scotland Europa offers pieces of advice regarding the application.
250
 For an 
enhanced profile for funding and for Scottish economy and research, there is need to 
interact with the EU without intermediaries in order to guarantee Scotland’s voice is 
heard.
251
 Scotland offices were backed up by regional government in order to make a 
representative body of their respective nation in Europe. They were also seeking some 
potential processes towards a decentralized government in the UK because the central 
government had the general funding gate keeping role. Noticeable, the regional offices 
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were not interested in areas by which their region was not covered by the hierarchy-making 
of the state government.
252
 Politicians such as Dick Knowles mentioned that bypassing the 
Westminster government and negotiating with Brussels is an advantageous process for 
regions. As euroscepticism in the UK grew, there were ideas of alliances to the detriment 
of the nation-state.
253
 Szeklerland did not enjoy such representation by now but there are 
attempts to form a representative unit in the process of increasing autonomy by bypassing 
the state.  
Towards a more radical claim for Scotland, supporters of independence state that in the 
current status quo the choices affecting the entire country, like economic policy, 
international relations and welfare, are the responsibility of the central government which 
represent a mismatching note with the Scottish interest in matters of European interest. 
Also, topics like fisheries, agriculture, employment, economic development and digital 
agenda are being argued in Brussels without representatives of the Scottish Government. 
Already unilaterally encompassing four NUTS2 territories, Scotland desires a future where 
it could take part in EU decision-making process as a regular member.
254
 Independence 
would provide “the ability to decide the level of capital investment that was appropriate for 
the Scottish economy, in the context of wider economic conditions and the need to 
maximize our long run economic growth rate”255(Appendices 13-26).   
Overall, taking into account that fund management is a complex matter and that the 
Commission seeks a balance in between control and local agency, under the overall UK 
Partnership Agreement, there are already individual Partnership Agreements with 
Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
256
 
In conclusion, being part of an older EU state, Scotland had time to gradually undergo the 
processes of increasing its autonomy within supra-national context. In this sense I argue 
that, just like these UK regions which gained increases in power gradually across a period 
of time, it is vital for Szeklerland to have its own administrative structure in order to take 
further steps in lobbying. Representing one half of the Centre Region would be a huge 
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impediment in advancing the ethnical Szeklerland region at EU level.
257
  
e) The EU influence in internal politics: 
Since 2007 the European Union co-financed in Romania projects of over €12m through the 
Structural Funds.
258
 The Regional Operational Programme aims at regional development 
following the lines of the National Development Plan and of the National Strategy for 
Regional Development. It pursues decrease of disparities in social and economical 
development between Romania and the average level of EU states.
259
 In the present EU 
internal context, it is substantial for the regions to enhance their participation on the 
internal market and in EU decision making.
260
     
Regarding the present reform, representatives of the Szekler National Council state that the 
Presidential Commission of Analysis of the Political and Constitutional Regime in 
Romania itself proposed a democratic solution of forming the new administrative units 
based on free will associations of local communities; instead of being drawn on a map in 
an office in Bucharest, it should be the will and the solidarity of the communities since that 
is how a sustainable decision is made. They also affirm that it is a mystery how, after such 
an official and researched proposal, there is still not more sustainable and more legitimate 
alternative to the mainstream one. There is no doubt that, in a free choice option, 
Szeklerland would represent a region by itself since the Hungarian minority is used to self-
organisation. And the same right should be offered to Romanians throughout the whole 
country.
261
   
More radical claims state the fact that EU structural funds is a pretext or context for a new 
reform whereas the true purpose is to gather the Hungarian minority in an administrative 
unit with a Romanian majority where they could not make their voices heard. The new 
administrative reform should be pursued according to the European principle in which one 
does not mark a region but recognizes an already existent one since across history Szeklers 
always had their administrative units even after the Communist reform in 1968.
262
 The new 
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regional development division represents an emergency priority in the interest of both 
Romania and Szeklerland and therefore it should not neglect the European practice of 
subsidiary or artificially force the three counties in the Centre Region. The drafting of new 
territorial units must be done after consulting the citizens as the European obligations of 
Romania require.  
Furthermore confirming MLG and Regionalism, European autonomies are successful only 
where the solidarity of local population is based on a strong regional identity that 
represents that region. Being aware of the fact that the process of EU regionalization can 
play an important role in promoting the idea of Szeklerland autonomy, that an increase in 
the role and importance of the EU Regions can be used in the favour of the Szeklerland 
cause, that a continuous representation of the local administrative authorities would be 
represented in the Commission of the Regions, the desire of the Szekler National Council 
is to use the structure of the European Union. They will contact Hungarian deputies in the 
European Parliament to forward Szeklerland’s aspiration for autonomy and to draft mutual 
projects that will make the cause more popular and will enhance regional self-governing.
263
 
The president of SNC also speaks of the importance of accessing European funds
264
 and of 
the fundamental values of the EU stressing the equality of peoples regardless of whether 
they live in their own state, or live in another country as historical communities. The 
second article of the European Union Treaty stresses the rights of the minorities. These are 
mutual values of the member states and of a society based on pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality. The EU structural reform 
emphasizes the concept of internal enlargement. In support of EU internal enlargement, 
the SNC is for a democratic change that strongly promotes subsidiary, the rights peoples 
have to self-determination and the emergence of new states. Such process must encompass 
a renegotiation of status quo in between the member states and the regions inside them, 
extend regional competencies, acknowledgement of communities desiring self-
determination by both extending the competencies of autonomous regions and protecting 
the regions with national, linguistic and cultural peculiarities at European level.
265
 The 
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Szekler people want the autonomy of Szeklerland and, as EU citizens, can settle and 
maintain bilateral relationships with other EU citizens and with the EU institutions.
266
 At 
Targu Mures the petitioners read a request towards the Romanian Government, asking for 
territorial autonomy for Szeklerland, the historical region where about half of the 1.4 
million ethnic Hungarians in Romanian live. The petitioners asked that Szeklerland 
became a separate unit when accessing EU Development funds
267
 and asked for 
territorial autonomy according to EU practice.
268
 More, SNC also expected support from 
the Hungarian EU presidency.
269
 
Autonomy and decentralization are steps towards independence. Certainly, the Romanian 
part agrees that the new regional decentralisation reform represents a chance to fulfil 
Szeklers’ greatest dream, ethnic territorial autonomy.270 They also fear that autonomy 
would bring about territorial division with separate financial, security and welfare 
institutions in a fully different administrative structure
271
 where the 25% Romanian 
minority in Szeklerland would be stuck with Hungarian as official language while the 
official and financially contributing Romanian state would remain mostly just a formal 
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structure. More radical voices claim that is just a matter of time until (alimented with 
financial support and after self-administration experience) the next desired step will be 
secession.
272
   
In addition to domestic lobbying under an EU generated context, Szeklerland opened its 
first representation in Brussels. Romanian MEP Ramona Manescu considers this action 
as an unprecedented attack towards Romanian sovereignty and territorial integrity. The 
Representation Office of Szeklerland in Brussels, located in the House of Hungarian 
Regions was opened on the 1st of June 2011 and held its first inauguration reception in the 
European Parliament building. Apparently, this representation is financially supported by 
the Hungarian Government and its aim is lobbying for the regionalisation and 
decentralisation reform in Romania to be performed on ethnical criteria,
273
 action which 
has the potential to cool the bilateral relationship in between Romania and Hungary.
274
 
In addition to that, the ethnic-Hungarian Romanian MEP, Laszlo Tokes, announces that 
2013 is the year of federalisation and autonomy in Romania. He also pleads for all 
Hungarians in Romania to get together and deal with the problems they have in relation to 
the Romanian majority. The means he argues for is imposing the will of the masses. Toro 
Tibor, the president of Hungarians in Transylvania Popular Party adds that the next context 
for reforms is the potential modifying of the country’s constitution. He gives the uprisings 
in Catalonia as an example and claims a special status for both Szeklerland
 
and Partium.
275
 
Also, a meeting for the autonomy of Szeklerland was organized in on the 10
th
 on March at 
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Targul Mures 2013 by SNC.
276
  
Scotland: Unlike the EU, the ruling superstructure which is the central Government in 
London wants to decide the terms of the referendum that might decrease the size of its 
territory. If Scotland becomes independent there are only two options regarding the EU. If 
considered a different state, Scotland would not inherit part of UK’s national debt and then 
it would apply for EU membership as soon as possible. If independent and seen as a 
successor of the United Kingdom, it would naturally remain a member of the EU with the 
same legal status as the other parts composing the present UK since its membership would 
be decided by majority voting in the Council of the EU. Moreover, independence 
advocates do not fear Spanish vote since the Spanish Constitution, unlike the British one, 
declares the country to be a unitary indivisible nation.
277
 Still, after Catalonia declaring to 
have drawn inspiration from Scotland,
278
 that may not be the case. Also, President Jose 
Manuel Barroso, in an interview about Scotland, told the BBC that new states hoping to 
join the EU would have to apply for membership.
279
 Statistics show that in 2012 support 
for full separation in Scotland was at around 30% provided that EU memberships were not 
at stake. The UK Government insists that the re-entry procedure would take place as in the 
case of a new state, with a unanimous vote that is difficult to acquire.
280
  
Nevertheless, it is not only Scotland that has great advantages from being part of the EU; 
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the region offers important assets (fishing, oil, gas and renewables), is an open market for 
products from other member states and offers education to over 16,000 EU students. It is in 
EU’s economic, social and political interests if Scotland continues to be a member.281 The 
Scottish Government and Scotland’s MEPs are looking forward for the future EU 
structural funds 2014-2020
282
 while, since 80 percent of Scottish exports are destined for 
the UK or the EU, economic growth is envisioned for 2014.
283
  
Prof. Crawford from Cambridge University states in an interview that new agreements in 
the international treaties will not present any major challenges since Scotland is an EU 
insider, fulfils the acquis already and there will be 18 months for negotiations with the EU 
in the interval between the potential yes and the actual independence.
284
 EU law Professor 
and former judge on the European Court of Justice, Sir David Edward, states the re-
negotiation would be performed from within the EU since Scotland has been a member for 
forty years and since its citizens have a rightful claim to European citizenship. Just like in a 
potential break-up of Belgium, nobody would dream of kicking a part of it out.
285
  
Besides, the former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations backed up the idea 
that Scotland would continue EU membership
286
 and Professor David Scheffer, declared 
that Scotland in the EU will be treated as a unique precedent.
287
  
Nevertheless, not all Scotland is necessarily decided on secession. The European Funds are 
important and if EU membership were to be uncertain, much support for independence 
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would be lost. That factor will probably be a decisive one in people’s voting choice at the 
referendum. Losing both national and supranational financing would be a disaster and 
therefore the part of Scotland against independence are most likely hoping to remain in the 
national arena but to bypass it as much as possible when it comes to EU matters. From 
a legal point of view, there is a wide range of competent opinions on what the EU status of 
an independent Scotland would be. The Scotsman newspaper offers sources who think that 
both new countries would become successors of the European Union and would 
renegotiate their membership. In such scenario, Scotland and the country made of England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland would be on equal footage in front of Brussels and are most 
likely to be able to continue their membership without restrictions. There is no way 
Scotland would be placed in the same category as states like Croatia which are applying 
for EU membership for the first time. This is also supported by the Scottish National Party 
which is certain EU membership is a sure goal. Experts from Commons library argue that 
one cannot know for sure in the lack of a precedent but still, whatever happens to Scotland 
would also mirror the fate of the rest of the UK.
288
 
f) Matters of external policy: 
“Scotland has been a key member of the regional association that published a Common 
Declaration on European Governance in May 2002; an association, which includes 
Aquitaire, Emilia-Romagna, Flanders, Hessen, Marche, Skåne, Tuscany, Wales, and 
Wallonie that aims to produce a ‘networked response’ to the debate about European 
governance that will support a greater role for the regions of Europe.”289 
Also, already in the on-going Yes campaign, Nicola Sturgeon is assuring like-minded 
countries (like Ireland) of a beneficial alliance with an independent Scotland.
290
  
Still, from the point of view of external recognition, countries such as Cyprus, Greece, 
Slovakia, Spain and, of course, Romania are given as examples of potential opposition 
towards recognizing a future Scottish independence and its EU membership.
291
 ”Half a 
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dozen European Union states fear the example that is being set for ethnic minorities within 
their borders […] Cyprus declared Kosovo a violation of the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Serbia […] Feeling is equally strong in Slovakia and Romania, where ethnic 
Hungarians make up 10 per cent and 6 per cent of the population respectively […] Some 
Slovak deputies openly accused their Hungarian compatriots of planning secession [and] 
Traian Basescu, Romania’s president, bluntly told a NATO meeting, [that Kosovo] is “a 
risky precedent [and:] What message are we sending to multi-ethnic societies or to others 
that are facing ethnic issues?” Further, “separatists in the Basque region, some of whom 
have now resumed to violence, look openly to Kosovo [and Scotland] for encouragement. 
Other regions – Catalonia, Valencia, Galicia – are also pressing for greater autonomy;” 
Belgium may also be in doubt. All these countries facing ethnic cleavages perceive “their 
motivation [as] nationalist and, like the Scottish National Party, they put their nation first. 
But nationalism in the Balkans is a raw, visceral force that the milder political culture of 
Western Europe easily underrates [...]. “Scotland in Europe” is a centrepiece of separatist 
strategy. As the debate on independence picks up, voters will seek reassurance that they 
will not be locked out on the doorstep”292 of the EU, the same way Kosovo is held back by 
Spain.
293
 
Further, in 2010 during an official visit to Romania, the Hungarian Prime-minister, Semjen 
Zsolt, declared that Hungary supports the cultural and territorial autonomy of 
Szeklerland.
294
 Hungary is, through all possible means, supportive of any path of 
protecting the interests of the Hungarians in Romania. There are only common interests for 
all Hungarians and the mother-country supports them.
295
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Chapter V – Analysis:    
Intro to analysis – wrap up facts 
What Scotland and Szeklerland have in common are: different identity than of the 
majoritarian population within the state, they claim similarities with another country or 
region than the state they are part of, they consider that national governments do not pursue 
the regional interest and do not possess the proper knowledge about the region’s 
peculiarities, they develop plans for noticeable change, they project the future as a stronger 
collaboration with the EU (Scotland worries that UK Euroscepticism might put them in a 
disadvantaged position while Szeklerland is struggling to become a separate administrative 
EU Region with legal personality, against the Romanian state which placed it in a 
majoritarian Romanian Region-Centre), they display a strong interest in EU funds 
(Scotland has administered its EU funds rather independently while the current aim of 
Szeklerland is becoming its own Region in order to administer the EU funds it strongly 
needs within their majoritarian Region and with an ethnical view). All in all, both regions 
count on the EU and its funds to bypass the national government up to autonomy 
(Szeklerland) and independence (Scotland).  
There are also differences to be found in between the two regions especially regarding their 
potential for influence: unlike Scotland, Szeklerland has a relatively undeveloped economy 
both at EU level and nationally, it is still part of a de facto unitary state with no 
independent Regional powers, has the geographical disadvantage of enclave aspect, is just 
as pro-EU as the state it belongs to and it could not sustain itself without the funds from the 
national level. According to MLG and Regionalism approach, these different domestic 
structures will impact the success of the two regions just as “external matters act as a 
function of a proportionality of the ability to act in internal matters.”296      
By extrapolating the claims of MLG (through deductive research design), I argue that the 
two regions are more (Scotland) and less (Szeklerland) successful in bypassing the national 
level and achieving more independence depending on national circumstances (especially 
current level of autonomy). While Scotland has been devolved since 1998 and may 
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potentially become a new country next year, in Szeklerland the self-governing process is 
still in a fairly incipient stage as the region is striving to use EU context to become 
autonomous, to position itself in the international arena and seeks to develop separate 
institutions and official interests so it could only then truly bypass the national 
government. In the case of Britain, multi-level governance is strengthened by the insights 
of a ‘domestic politics’ approach: the ‘differentiated polity’. The introduction of 
autonomous relationships in order to mimic market style relationships has increased the 
level of independence and created a complex bureaucratic topography.  
My two case-studies also show that conflicts in domestic relations (which normally 
remains national), have a higher tendency to move on EU level when it comes to separatist 
regions, being frequently propelled by ethnic and cultural identification. As MLG affirms, 
European governance will support a greater role for the regions of Europe.  
As presented by the empirical research of the previous chapter, what Scotland succeeded 
and Szeklerland may very likely be on the path of achieving is blending national and 
European levels while building webs of unilateral transnational interaction.
297 
The pattern 
of creating quasi-autonomous market-like structures (through “new public management 
(NPM)—deregulation, contracting-out, agencification, privatization” etc.) naturally 
favoured fragmentation and individualized different bureaucracies. Therefore, the so-called 
process of hollowing out of the state is not deliberate in its purpose.
298
 It is merely the 
outcome of structural and
 
Regional policy applied throughout the European Union. As we 
have seen in the case of Scotland, it led to a balance shift in between the regional agencies 
and the state in the advantage of the former.
299
 For example, in the previously-mentioned 
RECHAR case it becomes rather evident that the precedent did not mean a deliberate 
alliance in between the European Commission and the Regions but more of a decision 
made on a very particular case. Nevertheless, the occurrence brought about a noticeable 
power shift since, in a moment of discrimination from the state, it was the EC that 
represented a safety net and that followed up with a change in mentality and perception of 
the power relation going through the three levels. 
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Even at present, the EC stresses upon transparency to make sure, among others, that it is 
EU and not national projects being helped by the structural funding, and that encourages 
and facilitates a powerful grass route mobilization
300
 (re-motivation and means). 
Fragmentation due to EU policy domains re-activates the sub-regional;
301
 it is a rewarding 
environment for sub-national actors to operate and it acts as both incentive and enhancer 
for autonomist actions in regions that are actively seeking such outcome, since self-
administration represents a competent start for autonomy and/or separatism.
302
 In countries 
where societal cleavage and contested power-sharing patterns is a peculiarity, matters of 
non-state related financing become a strong facilitator and driving mechanism. 
The conditions that affect successfully exercising influence
303
 are fairly diverse and proven 
by the empirical part: establishing offices in Brussels as both Scotland and Szeklerland did, 
the reason for which it is so important for Szeklerland to be able to lobby in the name of an 
EU NUTS2 Region; reach out to similar regions or allied countries; pressure the national 
government to allow the region become a more important opinion poll regarding decisions 
related to the EU; set up formal means to influence the unilateral representation of the 
region in Brussels; contact Commission officials directly; trying to reach out to other EU 
institutions beyond the EC; participation in the Committee of the Regions; try to rise 
impediments to treaty amendments; stress the importance of subsidiary (one of the key 
words in the Szekler demands) as opposite to national level decisions etc. In time, such 
processes are in principle capable of shifting the balance away from the central 
government and towards the regional authorities. Still, it strongly depends from one 
autonomist region to another whether they have the capabilities and the resources to pursue 
these steps towards a more independent status quo.
304
 
Sub-national authorities exercise from great to almost no range of competencies in various 
distribution of domestic authority.
305
 The most relevant factors that make the difference in 
the visibility and weight of their voice in the EU arena are their status in the nation state 
and the strength of the mark national and international structures can place on them. 
Therefore, it is absolutely critical to stress that according to both empirical research and 
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MLG interpretation, regions should not be conceptualized under a homogenous approach. 
Due to specificities of “population, area, economic capacity, cultural background, 
institutional structure, political capacity, strength of their business, social networks, civic 
cultures” and so on, the path and the pre-requisites towards a better status quo will highly 
differ
306
 depending on “variations in the nature and extent of EU pressures and incentives 
over time both across and even within states.”307  
For Szeklerland it would be incredibly beneficial as an aspiring autonomist region within 
the EU if it could coincide with the institutional NUTS-division and overlap the separate 
identity to the purpose and the scope of the funds they intend to apply for.
308
 
In order to approach fund policies, national governments sometimes have to rearrange their 
political structures; that took form in erosion of nation-state sovereignty especially in the 
presence of active autonomist regions. Therefore, the EU can be practically seen as an 
external support system for those sub-national communities which try to escape from the 
control of their centre while creating institutional linkages with the supranational level. 
The EU has begun to be viewed “as a source of material support for economic 
development, especially through structural funds. From an institutional perspective, 
autonomists have used Europe as a framework for the international projection of the region 
and, in some cases, as a source of support for regional cultures and languages.”309 
Although mostly an economic motivation, the autonomist incentive is linked to historical 
territorial and cultural identities.
310
 Regardless of the present degree of regional liberty, 
there is constant room for bettering the status quo when interests and identities collide 
since “European integration [has a great potential to act] as an opportunity to escape from 
the authority of their nation-state.”311 
Consequently, changes in power balance bring about matters of democratic legitimacy: 
while the autonomist region claim further rights based on grass-route representation, it is 
fairly unlikely that it will obtain unquestionable unanimous international sympathy.
312
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Despite the attenuation in the significance of borders, the Westphalia international 
recognition system is still dominant in the EU. Moreover, also related to democratic 
accountability, there is a real danger that in a gradually stronger autonomy, regional elites 
and dominant politicians are liable in time to “becoming absorbed in the administrative 
grind of running a [structure] with numerous economic and social problems [or became a] 
new party of patronage.”313 
There is also a strong possibility that autonomist regions like Szeklerland and Scotland 
may never factually pursue independence and secession. Still, even if that were the case, 
they are still pursuing a looser state structure by using the EU as a safety net and as a both 
practical and discourse tool which also confirms my hypothesis of EU influencing 
autonomist regions in their quest for a more advantageous and more independent status 
quo.
314
        
In comparing with previous research in the field, I consider my conclusion enhancing to 
further understanding. Previous research applies to regular/typical national regions (used a 
the benchmark) while my conclusion refines the research towards the autonomist ones that 
perceive their origin, interests and desired future-direction to belong to a very different 
path than the one of the national government and intend to take over state functions in a 
zero sum-like game.  
One of the previous papers I compared my conclusion with was that of Michaël Tatham; 
only three years ago he wrote an inspiring draft paper for the 5
th
 ECPR Pan-European 
Conference on EU Politics in which he states, unlike my thesis, that it is not the case for 
devolution and fragmentation to aliment conflicts in between the national and the regional 
level on the European arena while facilitating bypassing of the former by the latter in 
Brussels and that MLG failed to capture state-region relations in Brussels after devolution. 
Although I strongly agree only with the fact that regions may not be influential players in 
the domestic EU policy-shaping,
315
 I argue that it can be a likely motif for regions with 
different identity and interests to seek for additional means to influence. Tatham’s opinion 
coincides with Szeklerland’s former state – “neither unidirectional nor strong enough to 
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[...] determine devolution and involvement levels.”316 Yet, I think Szeklerland is becoming 
more unidirectional towards the EU as a trend. As mentioned in state-of-the-arts, MLG 
literature has predicted greater autonomy from, and bypassing of, central governments by 
highly devolved regions; yet if those regions are not autonomists, the potential conflicts in 
between them will be only superficial and easy to compromise on (e.g. in the federal 
Germany and Austria). I believe Tatham may have researched a general rule that applies to 
regular national regions, but in the case of autonomist regions fragmentation acts stronger 
as a ”driver and enabler of territorial mobilisation at the EU level”317 and has a great 
potential to increase independence from the nation state. It generates in autonomist regions 
conflict on the national level followed by separate lobbying within the EU. Therefore, 
confirming what MLG states, regional unilateral relations with Brussels is connected with 
conflict between the national government and that region on the EU arena. Tatham also 
states that “below a certain level of devolution, the relationship between devolution and 
regional involvement is inexistent” which is proved inapplicable at least by the autonomist 
Szeklerland. Furthermore, he says that ”greater devolution has caused greater coordination 
and cooperation at the EU level.”318 It may be absolutely valid in the case of regular 
national regions but as this thesis proves, autonomist regions make a quite different and 
special case from the general rule. In my view, one of the main characteristics of the 
relationship between strong-autonomist regions and their national government is an 
implied perception of it as a zero sum game, especially if also associated with separatism. 
Every country has its own domestic political game but autonomist behaviour is different in 
the unlikeliness of the game summing more than zero in the majority of the cases (e.g 
RECHAR).  
One of the conclusions in Tatham’s paper was a “lack of a deterministic link between 
identity/culture on the one hand and territorial devolution of power.”319 Although I agree 
that devolution increases “independence from central governments,”320 as explained 
before, the success in acquiring more independence was not the topic of my study. Unlike 
the author states, my case-study shows that at least in the case of autonomist regions, MLG 
is correct in assuming that “greater independence in Brussels [understood as outcome of 
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national fragmentation] and greater conflict on the European scene”321 are in a causal 
relation. Moreover, Tatham outsources Charlie Jeffery that: “higher devolution levels are 
in fact associated with greater interaction and cooperation between the state and its regions 
in their European activities”322 and states that “while greater devolution has tended to 
increase the amount of conflict in domestic intergovernmental relations, it has not led to 
the expected increase in conflict in Brussels; to the contrary, greater devolution has caused 
greater coordination and cooperation at EU level,”323 which is certainly not the case for 
regions that try more-or-less to become the state itself. Beyond one of the most obvious 
examples of the contrary, a part of Scotland’s population desiring independence, 
Szeklerland opened its first representation office in Brussels outraging the Romanian state 
while domestically it tries to exploit the decentralisation of the public administration.   
Therefore, I do not agree that “cultural distinctiveness and historical heritage certainly do 
not cause devolution or institutionalised involvement.”324 It is not necessary that they do 
but if they display clear autonomist and/or separatist features, they are likely to.   
Regional actors can mobilize or, in fewer cases, they can also influence policy-making but 
as proven by the chapter above and in resonance with MLG, the map of sub-national actors 
influence is highly heterogeneous: the three governmental levels are interconnected but 
the spill-over from one to the others is not uniformly distributed since they own various 
national and international resources and pre-requisites. Nevertheless, once an agency is put 
into place under EU context it obviously takes over some roles. A new state of facts comes 
into being and MLG begins.
325
 As Charlie Jeffery states,
326
 sub-national actors are passive 
beneficiaries of spin-offs but I add: only if they are not resourceful and strongly 
individualized regions themselves and do not fulfil the criteria for influence mentioned in 
the theoretical chapter
327
 to become active beneficiaries.   
A stronger say in national European policy matters generally develops if the European 
policy itself somehow already infringed in the national policy-making
328
 (here is the 
involuntary EU agency that influences autonomist regions); for example Scotland has been 
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a receiver of EU funds for years. Such institutionalized practices change agency 
competencies and power and influence the perspective on democratic accountability - how 
that society should be ruled and what are the overall governing relationships within that 
particular state,
329
 especially for the population of the autonomist region.   
Conceptual framework 
After the undertaken research on the financial and institutional influence of the EU on 
autonomist regions, the conclusions reached confirm the hypothesis and do not necessarily 
infirm previous study in the field but it has extended the topic further towards a more 
particular and peculiar study group. More clearly, the extrapolations that results from this 
research have exceeded the expectations I had in the hypothesis and I hope it will provide a 
solid starting point for future projects. 
The European Union as a platform and as an institution provides both the re-motivation 
and means for autonomist regions in the EU to acquire a more advantageous status quo, 
approach I would like to conceptualize for easier reading as M&M. Yet, these regions find 
themselves in fairly various stages of resources and influence potential; the stronger the 
separate identity and administration is, the more likely it is to want or have the capability 
to use the EU context for an improved status quo both domestically and within the EU. 
Therefore, even if using the EU in this purpose, the goals reached are directly proportional 
to the resources and the outcome is different as they themselves are different in influence 
potential, by this confirming the MLG theoretical approach of heterogeneous side-effect of 
Europeanization, a result of supranational entrepreneurship and institutional learning.
330
     
NUTS division of any EU country creates a natural overall fragmentation since funds can 
also be interpreted as an individual race for needed funding but the main difference from 
this point of view in between regular national regions and autonomist regions is the desire 
for a bettered status quo that goes beyond regional rivalries within the state and implies 
taking over important state functions (especially externally). As presented in the empirical 
chapter, the de facto state in the UK is, due to devolution, a quasi-federal state despite the 
unitary de jure. Yet, it seems that there is a better status to be achieved even further than 
federalization as the supporters of independence prove. The difference lies in the different 
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identity and the different path to follow for the future, just as in the case of Szeklerland. In 
such case, the financing of the EU represents a most favourable context, an option that 
offers a helping structure while keeping enough distance to allow freedom of policy-
making and implementation for the national and regional actors.     
In conformity with New Regionalist claims, my case-study regions either have or aim at a 
political path build on different identity both in external and internal politics towards more 
decision-making and implementation powers. Power sharing leads to stronger tensions in 
unitary states than in federal one
331
 but there can be more freedom of manoeuvre even 
further than federalism. When different interests collide, direct decision-making and direct 
freedom of manoeuvre becomes incredibly appealing. Autonomist regions are more likely 
to react to the feeling of being discriminated, internationally under-represented
332
 or not 
sufficiently promoted as capable economic areas or to being on a low level in domestic 
political hierarchy. In such cases, regions fight back with ground mobilization (protests and 
referendums in Szeklerland and mobilization and independence referendum in Scotland) 
since their priorities are connected both to the different identity and to other plans of the 
future. 
In the race for a more independent status quo, the difference between succeeding and 
failing to reach the goal is a question of resources: economic, social and political-
importance in domestic politics and in quality of lobbying in Brussels. Again, my research 
is not on whether they will succeed in acquiring those further advantages or not, but on the 
EU context explained by MLG which provides a platform for action (an alternative for 
bypassing state government), opportunity that is in a way or another valued by the 
autonomists.  
My first conceptualization is the EU funds representing both re-motivation and means at 
the same time. Within the EU, non-eurosceptic autonomist regions are liable to the M&M 
drift. The directly distributed financial assistance offered by the funds act as a means of 
increasing independence from the state but also as the very inspiration of it (in the sense of 
a highly optimal circumstance for a long desired action-“when strong regional or national 
                                                          
331
 Geoffrey, “Conclusions.” 217.   
332
 ”Decission regarding Szeklerland’s External Relationas Service.”   
57 
 
identities, silent or suppressed for many years, are suddenly given a voice”333). EU 
unintentionally created not only an institutional and financial tool and an enhancer but also 
a potential gate for those who intent to use it in that way. Although the EU structure is 
certainly not the only usable structure for autonomist regions to become more independent, 
it represents both the incentive (drive) and a very convenient purpose-achieving tool. As an 
analogy for the M&M concept applied to the EU funds, we shall consider the example of a 
lock pick and a cage - “It is like wanting to leave home without making Daddy angry.”334 
A lock pick is not a key in itself; it could be almost any kind of tool designed for other 
purposes than the one of opening the cage (e.g. a hair pin). But once the prisoner has it in 
its hand, the lock pick doesn’t become only the mere tool but also the actual reason of 
inspiration. This first prisoner in the analogy represents autonomist regions; on the other 
hand the correspondent of a regular national region, due to lack of intentions to leave the 
cage in the first place, is the prisoner who would not even get the idea to use the hair pin in 
another purpose; for him the tool is not a lock pick. (Appendix 27) Just as a tool that 
extends its usages to our interpretation of it, the EU structure and funds could, if 
intended so by the users, become an enhancer of more decision-making, national and 
Community importance and enhanced freedom from national governments even up to the 
direct detriment of the latter.         
The second conceptualization I would like to contribute with would be the one of a 
feedback loop. The feedback loop is a good way of explaining a certain type of bilateral 
relationship. “From an individual’s viewpoint, a feedback loop exists when my system 
notices how the world responds to my behaviour and I adjust my behaviour in response to 
that response, and so on.”335 (Appendix 28) After the empirical qualitative research case-
study on Scotland and Szeklerland, I noticed a fairly direct proportional input-output cycle 
in the evolution of EU autonomist regions in time in the intermestic zone: EU funds trigger 
a stronger autonomy which in return triggers real potential for funds customized on the 
region’s need. By extrapolating on that, we can observe that just as it was the case for 
Scotland, in Szeklerland an improved position on the domestic arena (a potential separate 
Szekler EU Region) would bring about a separately financed self-administration from the 
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rest of the country which in turn would result in the feedback loop to an even better and 
more independent position nationally. As mentioned several times across the thesis, the 
two studied regions are highly different with regards to the stage of autonomy (from not 
even an officially acknowledged region to planning an independence referendum) and 
resources of all kinds. Yet, moving the feedback loop pattern onto Scotland we can assert a 
strong similarity of process - the 15 years of domestic devolution which coincide with the 
number of years as a separate EU funds receiving Region
336
 (UKM
337
) triggered so much 
regional independence in bilaterally collaborating with the EU that it turned into the 
project of keeping that practice from the position of a new member state from within the 
EU Community. Further, the same feedback loop applies to resources and representation: 
for better representation with better representation and for better resources with better 
resources.      
Moreover, since the feedback loop is basically a circle, the process can start in any part of 
the loop. Although the most common way is that domestic fragmentation brings about 
mobilization in Brussels, Szeklerland seems to have started at another point in the circle 
(with mobilization and lobby for specific fragmentation). With an autonomist purpose in 
view antecedents of regions growing stronger in close connection with the EU creates 
expectations.
338
 Scotland scores more than four times higher in the Summary of three 
institutionalised regional involvement indicators and regional authority index scores than 
all Romania in any point
339
-the stories of successful autonomists lift spirits even in places 
with close to zero regional authority.   
Tatham also states “when devolution levels remain low, institutionalised involvement 
remains quasi non-existent”340 but that is not the case in the feedback loop applied on an 
autonomist, where one can start with quasi-institutionalised involvement that can turn into 
fragmentation. Therefore, regarding his question “if there were no devolution would there 
be institutionalised regional involvement?”341, I believe the answer for autonomists would 
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be yes, but not as far as efficient as if it were to enjoy some sort of devolution, 
fragmentation or regionalization first.        
In addition to that, the European Commission and the Regions of the EU are not heading 
only in the direction of cooperation and potential alliance against the member states; 
various examples mentioned above proved that their interaction faces both ups and downs. 
Still, for the regions defined by separate identity the EU represents an incredible 
breakthrough of a useful structure.  
Autonomist regions can enjoy different constitutional empowerments and factual rights but 
while the perceived identity and paths are not in line with the ones of the nation state (for 
any reasons), such a handy facilitating structure as the EU is likely to be seen as a way 
towards more regional liberty - a better status quo by taking over state functions or, in an 
extreme case, political separation. As explained before, a lock pick is a key in the eyes of 
the target agent.       
On the other hand, in what concerns matters of democratic legitimacy, the attitude on that 
is almost opposite from the majority to the minority of that state. The nation state generally 
holds responsibility for the country as a whole - too much freedom and lack of cover from 
the state uncovers poor regions to hits from the free market.
342
 Plus, in the case of 
Szeklerland, there is also a minority within the minority: the 25% Romanians living in the 
area. Also, there is a minority in Scotland that wishes for independence but not within the 
EU
343
 (individual agency of eurosceptic autonomists).     
In conclusion, each autonomist region struggles for aims proportional to the available 
resources. Still, unless they are eurosceptic, they will consider how to make best use of the 
EU context and financing in by-passing the national government. Compared to Scotland 
which may “be as viably independent as Denmark, Finland or Ireland, countries of 
comparable size and wealth,”344 Szeklerland is not particularly resourceful, known and 
popular, nor did it have EU context until 2007. For that reason many of the battles of 
influencing EU policy are still only beginning at the national level among which a separate 
NUTS2 Region represents a vital stake.    
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In short, the theory was not only confirmed but also extended towards this particular 
direction and I strongly believe that the empirical results and the conclusions can be 
generalized and extrapolated to typical EU disintegrative-autonomist regions.  
Regarding assertions on the used methodology, I did not encounter noticeable mismatches 
with the nature and purpose of the present thesis since “comparison of a [single] case over 
a long period of time [...] weakens the ceteris paribus assumption as other factors – 
especially the depth of European integration – do not remain constant.”345 Therefore, 
simultaneously comparing asymmetrical domestic systems gave rise to qualitative findings. 
Chapter VI – Conclusion:   
To conclude, the findings of this thesis explain how processes of making a stronger 
separate regional identity by using EU context are observable in different stages. There is a 
gradual but noticeable direction in which the EU is unintentionally pushing states and 
regions simply through the existence of its bureaucracies and financing opportunities. 
MLG “focuses on the spin-off which emerged on interplay between the central state and 
European institutions and which more or less incidentally dispersed decision-making 
powers to the sub-national authorities thus empowering them to engage and to influence 
European policy processes.”346  
The EU member states range from strongly centralised unitary states to federal while they 
experience various administrative and political division between the regional and national 
level. Typically, unitary states try to bypass the formation of strong regional institutions 
(like in the case of Romania) while in devolved states the regional governments try to 
increase their own flexibility in relation to the centre. Also, major different interests 
between national and sub-national levels are brought by taxation and 
expenses. Organization of economic growth is not only different in between countries but 
also within the same country and will eventually develop
347
 ”patterns of spatial 
inequality.”348  
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The Europe of Regions-idea goes beyond pure MLG and predicts states to fall replaced by 
the two other levels. If so, it may be autonomists ones before those characterized by spirit 
of belonging
349
 (e.g. in Romania besides Szeklerland no other region seems to seek 
distancing from the state). 
Certain regions perceive European integration as a process that reduces the cost of 
their independence; the more practical ones use Europe as a context to promote their 
nationalist desires and find supporters and sympathisers. In the process of decentralisation 
and Europeanization, regions try to influence the EU in their favour, in the case of 
autonomist ones, even against the interest of their nation state. In a too decentralized 
Europe, it would become difficult for the EU to protect its cohesion.
350
  
In the media and public discourse, EU funds are mainly presented as a necessary tool for 
enhancing claims for more freedom of manoeuvre. Moreover, the funds are strongly 
proving MLG, including the possibility of bypassing the national level, if intended – 
“effectiveness of sub-national regions mostly depends on the quality of their institutional 
infrastructure and their ability to take action.”351  
In general, as explained by the spill over effect of MLG, there is no contradiction between 
the pursuit of national sovereignty and adhesion to a more closely united Europe. Most 
autonomist regions only seek more extensive self-government rather than outright 
secession. Some seek more unity with co-nationals in a neighbouring state. Even those that 
want a state of their own are tactically flexible enough to settle, in the near term, for 
something short of full independence
352
 especially in “a unitary administration [which] will 
be eroded by the cooperation in between the EC and regional levels.”353 Nevertheless, the 
EU offers regionalization for the purpose of financing. There is a side category of 
eurosceptic autonomists (like for example Catalonia of seventeen years ago); it believed in 
”internal colonialism” and considered the EU simply a ”rich man’s club.”354 After almost 
two decades though, and partially following the Scottish endeavour of seeking unilateral 
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EU membership in the detriment of loosing state protection
355
, Catalonia may be one of the 
next cases that will prove the conclusions of this thesis (having ”lack of financial 
autonomy” for a rich region as one of the main reasons for secession). In the prospect of 
their tax money supporting uncompetitive regions
356
, unilateral EU membership gains 
support: “In Catalonia, secessionism, European unionism, and globalism are deeply 
intertwined.”357 Even an initially eurosceptic autonomist region eventually discovered the 
EU context as favourable and useful
358
 - such topic makes a great intriguing topic for a 
next research.    
Being a typical separate identity autonomist region is related to ethnic/cultural 
characteristics and has a more complex definition than simple regional peculiarity (like 
French Bretagne or Germany's Bavaria or Saxony
359
). Still it is crucial to mention that 
there is a thin line between being merely a region with certain peculiarities and strong 
autonomist or even separatist tendencies, since a region is not equally autonomist 
throughout time. Peculiarities may be stronger or milder but they start mattering only when 
associated with the main characteristics of autonomist: culturally distinctness/historic 
regionalism, disadvantaging finances, radically different political plans and lack of 
freedom of manoeuvre, all ending up in actions of distancing. Maybe a new trend ”may 
in time engender a new set of economics-driven loyalties that weaken the pull of the old 
nation-states.”360 A third possibility for the future is for certain states to become a either 
symmetrical or asymmetrical federation; a vast number of people living in autonomist 
regions prefer that as a middle ground also since an event like a potential No outcome at 
the Scottish referendum would leave the region in little possibility of future complains.
361
 
“As a matter of fact, some form of asymmetric federalism has been one of the most 
                                                          
355
 Alex Henderson, “2012: A historic year for independence movements from Scotland to Catalonia?” Alba 
Social, February 23, 2013, http://www.albasocial.co.uk/2012-a-historic-year-for-independence-movements-
from-scotland-to-catalonia/.  
356
 The Economist, “Europe’s next independent state?” 
357
 Marta Poblet and Pompeu Casanovas, “Catalonia: independent but united with Europe?” The 
Conversation, September 13, 2012, http://theconversation.com/catalonia-independent-but-united-with-
europe-9516. 
358
 The Economist, “Europe’s next independent state?” 
359
 The Economist, “Devolution can be salvation.” 
360
 Ibidem.     
361
 The Economist, “Europe’s next independent state?”  
63 
 
pervasive proposals in Catalan politics.”362 Some scholars believe that decentralisation 
across Europe it has rather kept countries together than broken them up.
363
   
The research on autonomist regions of the EU is certainly not exhausted; only after a first 
precedent (such as the conclusions after the Scotland referendum), can we start a deeper 
scholarly research and infirm or confirm this thesis’ findings based on GT’s fit.     
President Charles de Gaulle, one of the founding fathers of the EU, said that there is no 
other form for Europe to be in than the one of the states.
364
 But “European integration in 
relation to the nation-states can be envisioned as a centrifugal one.”365 Also, “European 
governance has had a role on regions in different policy fields. Out of all, the most notable 
was the European Regional Policy which boosted the region’s position in the emerging 
European political system; it is illustrated by a broadening debate on subsidiary, growing 
regional activity in the international arena and the establishment of new institutions.”366 In 
that sense, Regions have learned to think individually since EU funds could boost 
economic productivity, decrease social inequalities and upstart modernization on a broad 
level.
367
  
It is hoped that the findings of this thesis on autonomist regions could be used not only in 
scholarly purposes but potentially by administrative and political institutions, as a sample 
of broader approach to a topic that unfortunately may seem only as a bunch of singular 
cases instead of a complex process systematically correlating itself with the EU. 
Expansions of the topic could be related to further research about EU autonomists (for e.g. 
changes in perception from a socio-constructivist point of view or using taxonomy for 
classification of autonomists). But what I would truly envision to study for further articles 
or hopefully a PHD is a comparison of EU autonomists with Canada’s autonomists: “EU-
Canada from a separatist point of view”.   
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